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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
.--
The Latin American policy of the ~nited States goes 
back to men like Henry Clay and James G. Blaine, those far-seeing 
visionaries who proposed and developed a Latin American policy 
when most people were ignorant of, or at least, unmindful of our 
southern neighbors. There bas always been a feeling of sympa-
thetic interest on the part of Americans for those who sought 
freedom from the mother country or from the crushing heel of any 
tyrant. In a measure this accounts for the attitude of most Nortt 
Americans toward our neighbors when they severed themselves from 
Spain and set up republics. 
It is true that until recently little or no effort has 
been made on our part to understand the difficulties "that have 
, 
sorely tried her younger and less powerful neighbors or to study 
~heir racial characteristics and customs with the friendly appli-
cation necessary to good relations be~een the states."l 
• 
Our interest in the emancipation of the Spanish colo-
" 
1 Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United 
States, New York, 1938, 10. --- ---
1 \ 
... 
2 
Pies was not entirely altruistic; there was always the dangerous 
.,
~ossibility of some European intrigue wbereby th~.colony might.be 
~ pawn and fall into the hands of aoEurop~an power stronger than 
. . , 
~ 
~he weakened hand of Spain. -That could become a serious threat 
~o our peace and security in this hemisphere. Secondly--there' 
~as the matter of trade. 
The attitude of the United States in respect to trade 
with Latin America has varied. From lalS to laSS was a period of 
.&.ntense interest. During the next thirty years commerce with 
Latin America was of little concern. In laaO there was a revival 
of interest which lasted until about 1900; from 1900 the interest 
~rew stronger and lasted throughout the period which embraced the 
First World War. The years follOwing 1930 were the depression 
rears and they were filled with discouragement and later wer~ 
~illed with anxiety because of the Nazi trade and propaganda 
~rives. The success of the Nazi m11it,ary machine in~rope 
~howed the importance of economic relations with Latin America. 2 
-. 
The fears of Thomas Jefferson seem logical and real; 
~pain could be a menace; any power could be a threat to ,the 
~obbly United States. Is it any wonder then that Thomas Jef-
~erson forsook some of his cher}shed ideals and concluded the 
2 J. Fred Rippy, South America !n£ HemiSPh,r~ Defense, 
paton Rouge, 1941, 44. 
... 
. ~' 
Louisiana Purchase? His claims to East and West Florida ~Jtseem 
o to have been a bit weak but his concern is underatandable--a 
foreign power on our border was a danger. • • 
Bemis considers the:"No-Transfer Resolution~ of lell 
which emerged from the great territorial problems of North 
America as the 
• 
first significant landmark in the evolution of its Latin 
American policy. • • • In 1939 it became a joint declared 
policy of all the republics of the New World. It is at 
once the earliest and the most recent expreRsion of the 
Latin American policy of the United States. j 
The "No-Transfer Resolution" was a stepping stone to the Monroe 
Doctrine of le23. 
During the period beginning with lelS our official 
policy toward the Spanish colonies was one of neutrality, despite 
the fact that unofficially we were sympathetic to the revolted 
colonies. The neutrality laws were violated to such an extent 
that the Spanish Minister protested vehemently in Washingto". 
Henry Clay4 had long opposed Adams' policy of non-
recognition of the republics which had broken with Spain; Clay \, 
believed that much was to be gained by recognizing them. Finally 
3 Samuel Flagg Bemis! !h! Latin American Policy £! ~ 
United States, New York, 1943,.jO. 
4 Van Dusen, The Life of Henrt Clay, 122, cited in Thomas A. Bailey, ! D~B1O:mat1C His-tory £: 1h2 ~merican People, 
hth ed., New York, 1'"9"5 , 10'7. .' , 
I 
I , 
I 
I 
1 
when there seemed.to be no possibility of Spain regaining them 
through the aid of some European country, and whe,p there seemed 
to be nothing to be lost by recoglrl.zing 'tihem, the United States 
under James MOnroe recognized-the independence of the revolted 
\ ' t 
colonies. Thus we ~ere the first nation outside of Latin America 
to recognize their independence. This set an example for the 
other nations of the world to follow. 
The Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral statement of policy 
that bound the United States to no nation,S was the next major 
step in the Latin American policy of the United States. Pres-
ident Monroe issued his famous message on December 2, 1823. 
While the message was really a summary of American foreign poli-
cy, the message is best known for these two statements: 
and 
the American continents, by the free and independent con-
dition which they have assumed and maintain are henceforth 
not to be considered as6subjects for future colonization by any EUropean powers. 
The political system of the allied powers is essentially 
different in this respect from that of America. • • • \-le 
owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations 
existing between the United States and those powers to de-
clare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to 
• 5 Bemis, Latin American PolicX, 99. 
6 J. D. Richardson, Messa~es and PaEers of the 
fresident~, Washington, 1896, II, ~O ;- --- --\~ 
\, 
, 
... 
extend their.system to any portioD7of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. 
The Monroe Doctrine is evidence that th'e United States 
early developed a Latin American policy that ~ombiDed idealism 
.--
and realism. It is true that it did not become an important 
document upon its publication but in later years it served as a 
cornerstone of Latin American policy. 
During the years of expansion and the realization of 
our Manifest Destiny, a Latin American policy was always evident 
and a definite part of our foreign policy. Naturally, it was not 
a selfless policy; a nation must have some self-interest to sur-
vive. 
The United States was invited, or invited itself, to 
send representatives to the Panama Congress in 1825.8 Henry C. 
Clay, always an ardent enthusiast of Latin America, urged ac-
ceptance of the invitation. After much difficulty President John 
Quincy Adams acquiesced, but unfortunately our ~epresentatives 
never reached the Congress. Little or nothing was accomplished, 
yet Bailey credited this Congress with beginning the ideals of \1 
Pan Americanism. He said: "None ot its recommendations was ever 
7 ~. J II, 218. 
8 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 195. 
\ 
................. ---------------------"~-... -
...... ,."'. 
... 
i 
6 
adopted; none of its projected meetings was 'ever h~ld. Yet the 
" ' 
germs of the Pan American ideal, whic'h was to assume considerable 
significance, were definitely pl~ted •. "9 ~ , 
t 
Again in 1847-1848 another at~empt 'was made to assem-
.. 0 
ble -the peoples of this hemisphere at Lima, ~eru for the "Con-
. ' 
greso Americano". The failure of this congress, according to 
Vfuite,lO was due to the fact that the United States was engaged 
in war with Mexico in which we acquired nearly half of what had 
been Mexican territory. White said: 
The most solemn pledges of the Congress had been made 
against just such acts of "aggression" as this. The Ameri-
can MOnroe Doctrine had been aimed at any such gobbling up 
of Latin-Amiiican territory--but only by an aggressive Euro-
pean powerl 
The crystallization of Latin American policy c~mes to 
the fore in the administration of Benjamin Harrison when he ap-
pointed James G. Blaine as Secretary of State. Blaine had defi-
nite positive ideas about a Latin Am~rican policy. So farseeing 
was Blaine in matters concerning Latin America that he invited 
the republics to meet in Washington to consider and discuss the 
9 !.lli., 196 
10 John W. White, Argentina, !h! ~ StorI £! ~ , 
Nation, New York, 1942, 119. 
11 Ibid., 1. 
- . 
\ 
7 
methods of preventing war between the nations of America. The 
group met in Washington in 1889 with .Blaine gi Yin,S the address of 
welcome before the delegates. He' said: 
Your presence here .~s no ordinary event.. It signifies 
much to the people of all America today. It may signify 
more in the days to come. No conference of nations has ever 
assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions 
so vast and to contemplate the possibilities of a future so 
great and so inspiring. • • • 
We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty 
confidence, will save all American States from the burdens 
and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted the older 
nations of the world. 
We believe that friendship avowed with candor and 
maintained with good fa! th, wili remove from American States 
the necessity of guarding boundary lines between themselves 
with fortifications and military force. 
We believe that friendship and not force, the spirit of just law and not the violence of the mob, should be the 
recognized rule of administration2between the American nations and in American nations. l 
Blaine 'also developed the idea of the United States 
acting as arbiter of disputes between the American republics, and 
, 
the American republics and Europe instead of turning to non-
Americans for aid in settling such disputes as might arise. The 
'4 
outstanding feature of Blaine's Latin American policy, however, 
12 Senate Executive Documents, Vol. 14, No. 232, 
Pt. 1, 51st Congress,-lst Session, Washington, 1890, 39-42. 
\ 
\, 
, 
s 
was the meeting in,1889 of the First International American 
Conference in Washington. Bemis commented on thi~ conference: 
The Secretary's ostensible purpose in assembling the 
Conference seems to have been the'promotions of trade and 
arbitration; but, ••• it was the harbinger of a memorable 
movement that was to yield richer results in riper times, as 
Blaine himr~lf prophesied in his closing address to the 
delegates. j 
This Congress failed to accomplish as much as had been 
hoped for but it did achieve the formation of what came to be 
known as the Pan American Union. Baileyl4 contended that the 
First International Congress was the wedge for the future gather-
ings. He feels that the friendly manner shown to the Latin Amer-
icans helped to dispel their suspicions. Finally the reciprocal 
~ariff reductions by treaty, which the Conference found to be 
. Plore practical than a customs union, gained considerable backing. 
The advent of imperialism led to a new era in our Latin 
~erican policy marked by the Cuban question and numerous others 
:lhich involved Latin America in our destiny. This era with its 
~mperialistic tendencies, the policy of expediency, nonrecog-
~ition, Platt Amendment, intervention, exploitation, "Big Stick" \, 
diplomacy, dollar diplomacy and interference did not help to 
13 Bemis, Latin American Policr, 126. 
14 Bailey, Diplomatic History, 445. 
\ \ 
, 
9 
. create any feelings of good will or neighborliness. These pol1-
: cies only helped to a~ouse further hatred an! suspicion of our 
~, 
" Ineighbors toward our motives the~ and ~n the years to come. 
Hinton15 comments orr these events in his biography of-
Hull, saying: 
The whole episode of lS9S had awakened apprehensions 
among the Latin-American republics. These were not allayed 
by subsequent developments between the United States and 
Cuba and were fanned to white heat by the revolution which 
separated Panama from Colombia and made possible the con-
struction of the Panama Canal. There was considerable feel-
ing among our neighbors to the south that the United States 
had driven Spain out of Cuba only to make the island an 
American dependency as had been done in Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines. The imposition of the Platt Amendment, giving 
the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs 
for ~he pur~ose of preserving order, lent color to their 
suspJ. cion. J.b 
The diplomacy created by the Panama question did not 
alleviate the suspicions of our neighbors and the "Big Stick" -
'diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt helped to widen the brea.ch. The 
Roosevelt pronouncement, generally referred to as the Roosevelt 
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, justified the intervention in 
Latin America by either the United States or a foreign country, 
was proclaimed on December 6, 1904, in these words of Roosevelt: 
15 Harold Hinton is a newspaper man who writes for the 
~ ~ Times. He has also written a biography of Cordell Hull. 
16 Harold B. Hinton, Cordell ~, Garden City, 1942, 
\ 90. -
\, 
... 
10 
• • • All that this country desires is to see the neigh-
boring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any 
country whose people conduct themselves well ,.can count upon 
our hearty friendship. Chronic wrongdoing • • • may in 
America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by . 
some civilized nation, and in the-Western Hemisphere the 
adherence of the United States, however, reluctantly in 
flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the 
exercise of an international police power. l ·t 
Bailey maintained that public opinion in the United 
States generally supported the Roosevelt corollary, while in Latin 
America very little concern was shown.1S Several years later when 
~rines were landed in Central American and Caribbean republics to 
enforce the Roosevelt corollary, Latin America protested strongly. 
Taft and his dollar diplomacy hardly added an amicable 
~hapter to Latin American affairs, nor did Wilson's watchful 
~aiting. The Panama Canal project became a realization and with 
~t came an awakened interest in our sister republics. Their 
~rderliness especially, those near the Big'Ditch, became more and 
~ore important to the Canal. Taft had been anxious to have money 
~nvested in Latin America and once the investments were made, it 
~as an easy, logical step for his and the follOwing adminis-
trations to protect the investors and their investments under the 
December 
17 Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 3rd 
6, 1904, Vol: 39, pt. I, Washington, 1905, 
1$ Bailey, Diplomat~c Ristor!, 559. 
Sess., Tuesda),' 
19. 
\ 
\, 
-".-,.~. 
11 
oosevelt corollary. It was necessary to justify the interventio 
y pointing to the benefits secured to' Latin America under our , 
. ,,,,
rotective and profitable guidance, to say nothing of the benefit 
accrued to the investors of the United States. 
Woodrow Wilson's administration marked a beginning of 
the repudiation of economic imperialism, which was interrupted by 
World War I. Wi th the repudiation of our former Latin American 
, policy there began a period of more satisfactory relations with 
our southern neighbors. The sky was not entirely cloudless but 
it began to point to happier days. Wilson was fundamentally a 
noninterventionist despite his intervention in Mexico. Bemis19 
claimed that Wilson really was the inspiration for the new Latin 
American pollcy which came to be known as the Good Neighbor 
policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt. ,. 
f': 
It was Secretary of State Charles E. lfughes who made 
strides toward the liquidation of the policy of intervention 
, 
which the United States had used in Latin America. He tried to 
convince the republics to the south that the "Big Stick" did not 
mean imperialism. His first step in the liquidation process was 
,(lorking out of a plan for the evacuation of the Marines from the 
Dominican Republic. 
The Washington Conference of 1922-1923 was held under 
\ 
19 BemiS, Latin American Policy, 199. 
·.- .... ~ 
12 
, Hughes's chairmanship. This Conference produced thirteen tr~a-
ties. According to Bemis20 these treaties were ,a miniature 
" f 
experiment in inter-American peace and solidarity worked out in 
. 
Washington by Hughes'land Sumner Welles. "To him Sumner \'1elles 
has been ascribed the elaboration if not the inspiration of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy.,,2l 
Hughes had taken great care to make it clear that he did not 
accept the Roosevelt corollary to the MOnroe Doctrine. Thus did 
Hughes do his part to 'create more amicable relations between the 
Americas by his attempts to get rid of intervention and the 
fostering of good will with our neighbors. 
The new Secretary of State, Kellogg directed J. Reuben 
Clark, Jr., Undersecretary of State, to work out an historical 
explanation of the MOnroe Doctrine to show that the Roosevelt 
corollary was not a legitimate offspring of the Monroe Doctrine. 
The result is a collection of documents giving the 
background, principles, and instances which might be or have 
been considered as falling wi thin the principles of the Monroe \ \ 
Doctrine. It is known as the Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine • 
...................................... - - --- ----......... ~ 
This memorandum rejects the Roosevelt corollary and the imperi-
alistic principles of our foreign policy. 
20 ~., 207-208. 
21 Ibid., 20$. 
\ 
,\ 
, 
13 
In the preface Clark made it clear that the Monroe 
Doctrine does not concern itself with purely in~er-American 
affairs. The author said: 
••• The DOctrine .states a case of the United States 
vs Europe, and nQt of the United States vs Latin Ameri- I 
ca. • •• So far as Latin America i~ concerned the Doctrine 
is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence 
and oppression but an unbought, fully bestowed, and wholly 
effective guaranty of their freedom, independence, and 
territo~~al integrity against the imperialistic designs of 
Europe. . 
Thus this Memorandum backed up the Hughes interpreta-
,tion. It repudiated the corollary but preserved the right of 
intervention. 23 
Herbert Hoover was another staunch believer in culti-
vating the friendship and good will of our neighbors. His good 
will trip to Latin America and his friendly atti.tude as President-
elect did much to foster good feelings. In his inaugural address 
he stressed the fact that we did not desire any economic or 
territorial domination of any other people. He declared: 
The United States fully accepts the profound truth that 
our own progress, prosperity and peace are interlocked with 
the progress, prosperity and peace of all humanity. The \, 
whole world is at peace. The dangers to a continuation of 
this peace today are largely the fear and suspicion which 
still haunt the world. No suspicion or fear can be right-
fully directed toward our country. 
22 J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, 
Washington, 1930,xxiv. - -
\ 
23 Bemis, Latin America~ PolicX, 22. 
, 
i 
I 
I 
14 
Those who have a true understanding of America know 
that we have no desire for territorial expansion, for 
economic or othe~ domination of .other people~. Such 
purposes are repugnant to our ideals of h~an freedom. 
• • • the American people are engrossed in the building 
for themselves of a new economic 'system, a new social 
system, a new political .system--all of which are charac-
terized by aspirations of freedom of opp~4tunity and 
thereby are the negation of imperialism. 
Hoover proved his policy regarding Latin America and 
the abandonment of dollar diplomacy, intervention, and imperial-
ism when he withdrew the last troops from Haiti and Nicaragua 
and 'again when he failed to exercise treaty rights on several 
occasions. He was determined to carry out his policy of nonin-
tervention, de facto recognition, and to prove our departure from 
imperialism. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the presidency with 
rather definite ideas against intervention in the home affairs of 
our neighbors and the need for joint action in case of distress 
in one of our neighboring countries. At his inauguration March 4, 
. 
1933, he had the good fortune to name the policy which we rv" 
call the Good Neighbor policy, by referring to the polie' ~,.;.' his 
administration as that of the good neighbor--nJ~. ::leaning 
Latin America--but the whole world. In the inaugural address he 
said: , 
. 24 Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 1-39, 'iJ.st Cong., 
1st Sess., Document 1, Mardi 4, 1929, washiiigton, 1929, :7. 
\, 
15 
In the field of world policy, I w,ould dedicate this 
Nation to the policy of the good neighbor--the neighbor who 
resolutely respects himself, and, because he,~oes so, 
respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects 
his obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in 
and with a world of neighbors. We now realize as we have 
never realized before our-interdependence on each other;25 
that we cannot merely take, but must give as well •••• 
Thus these were the major steps which led to the Good 
: Neighbor policy as we know it today. It was founded on the 
repudiation of imperialism, dollar diplomacy, "Big Stick", and 
intervention; it was founded on a freer flow of trade, non-
I intervention in the affairs of our neighbors, consultation, 
amicable relations, and coequality. 
25 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses 2£ Franklin ~. Roosevelt, Vol. II,-,t933) New YOrK; ~g, 131. . 
\, 
, 
.... -.......... ..,-
CHAPTER J:I 
.. 
, 
HULL AND NONINTERVENTION 
..--
For the world and especiall~ £or Latin America, 
Roosevelt's choice of a Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was an 
extremely fortunate one. In Cordell Hull was found one devoted 
to a cause which he put above all else, even the possibility of 
election to the highest office in our land. He firmly believed 
that the security of the United States was based on trade and, 
therefore, it was necessary to have a freer flow of trade; that 
it was necessary for us to maintain amicable relations with our 
neighbors; that it was necessary to follow a policy of noninter-
ference and nonintervention. These were the fundamental princi-
ples of Hull's Latin American policy. Because Hull was an intel-
lectual idealist, sincere, loyal, patient, yet strong, firm, 
amiable, shrewd and persistent he was able to realize the policy 
v/hich he had so carefully planned. 
Friends of Hull advised him not to accept the post 
offered by President Roosevelt. He weighed the matter a long 
time and very carefully; he came to the decision to accept be-
cause he saw in the Department of State an opportunity to 
16 \ " 
\. 
.. ' ..... ~,. .. 
" 
17 
practice some of his fundamental beliefs. For example, h~:l felt 
that the economic situation at this period in our,.history .was 
, caused by restrictive trade barriers.~ In the office of Secre-
tary of State, Hull thought that he would'nave a better oppor-. 
tunity to initiate the plans which wouldtielp to obliterate some 
of the restrictive measures. In accepting the office he had a 
talk with the President in which he made it perfectly clear that 
i the only condition under which he would ~ccept the office was 
that he was to have a perfectly free han~; it was not to be a 
post at which he would merely carryon the correspondence of the 
State Department.2 With this freedom which he' demanded he knew 
full well the responsibility and accepted the office with hope 
and courage. 
The following quotation from ~ullts statement on inter-
national policies sums up his policy in his own words: 
-
This country constantly and consistently advocates 
maintenance of peace. We advocate national and inter-
national self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all 
nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from 
interference in the internal affairs of other nations. 
We advocate adjustment of problems in international '. 
relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agree-
ment. We advocate faithful observance of international 
agreements. Upholding the principle of sanctity of 
1 Graham H. Stuart, ~ Department 2! State, New York, 
1949, 310. 
2 Cordell Hull, ~ lvlemo.irs of Cordell Huli, >New York, 
1948, I, 158 • 
18 
treaties we believe in modification of provisions of 
treaties, wh'en n~ed therefor arises, by orderly processes 
carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommo-
dations. We believe in respect by all nations for ~~e 
rights of others and performance by all nation~ of 
established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and 
strengthening of international law. We advocate steps 
toward promotion of economic security and stability the 
world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive 
barriers in international trade. We seek effective 
equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all 
nations application of the principle of equality of treat-
ment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. 
Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces ade-
quate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or 
increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions 
or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering 
into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in 
cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable~means in 
support of the principles hereinbefore stated.~ 
Roosevelt addressed the Pan American Union on April 14, 
1933, and in this address he emphasized our poll'cy toward Latin 
~erica. Bemis4 said that Roosevelt did not really announce a 
:lett( policy; the speech reflected the conclusions of Sumner Welles 1 
book, Naboth's Vineyard. In his address Roosevelt said: 
Your Americanism and mine must be a structure built of 
confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only 
equality and fraternity. It finds its source in the hearts 
of men and dwells in the temple of the intellect. \, 
We all of us have peculiar problems, and, to speak 
frankly, the interest of our own citizens must, in each 
instant, come first. But it is equally true that it is of 
3 Cordell Hull~ Fundamental Principles of Internation-II Policy, Washington, 19J7, 1. -
4 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 259. \ 
'": " ....... 
19 
vital interest to every Nation of this Continent that the 
American Governments, individually, take" without further 
delay, such action as may be pos'sible to abolish all un-
necessary and artificial barriers and restriction~ which 
now hamper the healthy flQw,of trade between the peoples 
of the American Republic.' . 
. -- . 
This last sentence is of extreme importance because it 
expresses the philosophy and hope of Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull. Hull fought for the lowering of trade barriers during his 
long term of office; he felt that trade barriers were partly 
responsible for our economic ills during the depression and defi-
nitely responsible for our unfavorable balance of trade. As 
early as 1914 Hull had formulated this philosophy and felt that 
if we could get rid of economic rivalry it would enable us to 
increase commercial exchanges among nations and remove nunnatural 
obstruction to trade, we would gp a long way toward eliminating 
war itself. n6 Hull went on to add: 
-
The year 1916 is a milestone in my political thinking. 
Then for the first time openly I enlarged my views on trade 
and tariffs from the national to the international theater. 
Hitherto I had fought hard for lower tariffs, largely 
because of their immediate domestic effect. I believe that 
high tariffs meant a higher cost of living for American 
citizens. They assisted in building up monoplies and trusts 
By cutting dotm the sales of other countries to us, the? 
also cut dotm the purchases by other countries from us. 
In considering the Latin American policy of Cordell 
130..;.131. 
5 Rosenman, Publig Papers £! Roosevelt, II, (1933), 
\ 
6 Hull, Memoirs, I, 84. 
7 Ibid., 81. 
\ . 
20 
ull, it is necessary to take into consideration the attitude of 
tin America toward the ~Colossus of the North~ a~d thereby judg 
he influence which Hull exerted to bring about more amicable re-
ations aided and abetted to some extent by the exigencies of 
orld War II. 
The temperament and nature of the Latin American must 
also be taken into account. His background is essentially Euro-
pean; his culture and heritage are essentially European. He feEd 
a closer tie to Europe than he does to the United States. The 
Latin American is by nature filled with pride and an intense 
spirit of nationalism. 
Argentina, especially, has felt that her place in Latin 
America is that of the leader. She has felt an unusually strong 
antipathy for the United States because she feels that we are 
trying to usurp her position of leadership in South America and 
because of our refusal to accept Argentine beef because we are 
afraid of the spread of hoof and mouth disease into our country. 
Practically every step of the way Argentina has fought the United 
States. g 
Cordell Hullts philosophy toward the Good Neighbor 
POlicy of the admini stration can best be summed up in his o\m , 
'.'lords: 
\ ' 
.' 
$ The question of Argentina will be discussed in a 
later chaptero 
, 
... ,"""'-. .. 
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A decade of steady implementation of the Good Neighbor 
policy was now to follow. It was not always to be smooth 
rafting, and we were to encounter to\meads i:p.our stream of 
friendship. Great patience was requiredt and disappoint-ments were sure to be encountered. But had long before 
realized that the achievemeht of worthwhile aims often 
called for extreme patience and sometimes serious personal 
and official embarrassment, and I therefore formed a defi-
nite resolution that I would undergo any such experienceofor 
the sake of vitally important long-view-accomplishments.~ 
Throughout his administration Hull did all he could to 
implement the good will policy toward our neighbors. He was ably 
assisted by his assistant Sumner Welles, a career diplomat, and 
also by a well qualified group of experts in the Division of 
Latin American Affairs. Sumner Welles had general jurisdiction 
over the Department of Inter-American AffairslO and formulated 
many of the plans and policies. 
The Latin American world was almost unknown to Hull. 
His only previous experience with the area had been during the 
I Spanish American War when Hull served with the army in Cuba. 
Certainly this did not prepare him for- the tasks at hand, in fact 
this was an unsatisfactory backgroundll for one who was to formu-
late and direct the affairs of the United States with such a \, 
large and complex.area as Latin America. However, what Hull 
9 Hull, Memoirs, I, 350. 
10 
1944, 200. 
11 
Sumner Welles, ~ f2! Decision, New York, 
\ 
Stuart, ~epartme~~ 2! State, 310. 
, 
• 
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: lacked in background and experience, h~ made, up for in sincerity 
: and devotion to the job at hand and the ~llingne~,15 to work un- . 
, tiringly for the policy. 
: 
Hull carefully checked the character and the fitness of 
officers in the Department of State and kept most of the seasoned, ~ 
experienced persons in the key positions which they had held 
previously.12 He inaugurated the system of daily press confer-
encesl ) and no matter how busy he was he insisted upon receiving 
the representatives of the press and radio. In his relations 
with the diplomatic corps, Hull believed in complete frankness 
and demanded that his subordinates deal with problems in the same 
frank manner.l4 
Hull's heritage in Latin America was not a pleasant one 
In his Memoirs, he said: 
Our inheritance of ill will was grim. It was probated 
under the name of Intervention; intervention in Panama to 
separate Panama from Colombia and build the Panama Canal; 
intervention in Mexico; interventionlin Cuba; intervention 
in Haiti; intervention in Nicaragua. 5 
Hull adds that not only was there this feeling against us but 
also there was a lack of unity among the republics themselves • 
The Chaco War was in full swing between Paraguay and Bolivia. 
12 Hull, Memoir~, I, 180. 
13 Stuart, Department .2A State, 314 • , 
14 ~., 315. 
, 
'-
15 Hull, Memoirs 
_ .., •.... ,.,,-_ .. ' I, 308. 
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A conflict was smoldering between Colombia and Peru over a border. 
~n Cuba a revolution was brewing.16 
The fundamental policy 6f Hull was on~ of noninter-
~ention in the affairs of Latin America.~ He. had resolved th~t te 
pould be ~riends only if we abandoned the right to intervene in 
~heir internal affairs. He had helped to write the plank in the 
Democratic platform in 1932 which stated "No interference in the 
1nterna1 affairs of other nations" and also "Cooperation with 
nations of the Western Hemisphere to maintain the spirit of the 
t,ionroe Doctrine. "17 
Hull realized that Latin American policy had to be based 
pn "mutually beneficial policies and principles, political, eco-
~omic and morB:l."l8 These principles and policies must\~e backed 
. -, .... 
~p by actions and not merely by lip service. These act~nsJ he 
~aintained, must be "delicate and tactfu1."l9 It is our job to 
establish trust and confidence thereby creating a new relation-
ship with our neighbors. 
When Hull ha~ been in office only two weeks he was askec 
by the League of Nations to join in settling the Leticia border 
Jispute between Colombia and Peru. Roosevelt and Hull decided 
16 !12:!.s!. , 309. 
17 !.ill. , 309-310. 
\ 
1a Ibid. , 310. 
19 Ibid. 
\ . 
to cooperate by having a representative take part but without the 
~ower to vote. Hull commented on this cooperati v,e move:-
Our acceptance signified our willingness to cooperate 
with other nations in the settlement of Latin American . 
questions. Unilateral action on our part was now in the 
discard. We began to apply a principle to which we adhered 
in the years to follow. This was to refrain from acting 
until after having consulted with all the other interested 
nations. Only in this way could we work from under the deep-
seated resentment engendered in L~ain America by previous 
one-sided actions of our country. 
Cordell Hull proved himself in the eyes of the Haitians 
~hen he announced that an executive agreement was signed which 
provided for the withdrawal of United States Marines from Haiti by 
The Marines had been stationed there I the end of October, 1934. 
f since 1915. The executive agreement also provided less stringent 
financial arrangements for Haiti which would naturally aid her 
economic recovery. Hull credited the new pact to the fact that 
I Haiti, under the more stable leadership of President Stenio 
I ~incent, had bettered conditions in Haiti 'to a marked degree. 21 
I Comment was made on the fact that an executive agreement 
! aad been used rather than a formal treaty. According to the ~ 
, 
I York Time~, Secretary Hull said: 
! 
"that the executive agreement 
• ! 
had merely been found a quicker method of arriving at the settle-
20 !£!£., 310-311. 
21 ~ 1.2!:.!£ Times, August 9, 1933, pt. 1, ~:~: 
, 
.. 
25 
~ent desired by both countries."22 
The Chicago Daily ~ ran an editorial ,~ntitled 
;'pulling Out of Haiti" in which t~ey said that the pulling out of 
-tai ti was not receiving the attention that" it should because of 
vhe Cuban crisis. The editorial commented that the executive 
19reement "represents a significant modification of this country's 
Caribbean policy and should contribute much to that improvement 
Jf relations with other Latin American nations •••• "23 The 
3ditorial went on to state that much criticism had been leveled 
; ~t us because of our policy of intervention which sometimes led 
to exploitation of "backward people for the profit of American 
capital."24 The same editorial pointed out that Haiti has gJ.ven 
very little recognition to the preservation of law and order and 
the improvement in finance, public health and welfare under the 
benevolent hand of the United States. 25 
These early references to Hull's actions on Latin 
American policy are significant in that th~y show plainly the 
desire and intention to carry out the Good Neighbor policy with 
the active cooperation of the press because the overall coverage 
\'las fa.vorable at this time. Much damage can be and is done by 
22 Ibid. 
-
23 Chicago ~ailI News, August 11, 1933, pt.\l~ 14:1. 
24 ~. 
25 Ibid. 
\, 
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the press when disparaging remarks are made by hostile writers, 
as will be pointed out in a later instance. .. 
The next major problem of the Secretary was that of 
. ' . 
Cuba. The Cuban situation had been growing more, difficult since 
1925 because of the dictatorship of General Machado. Things had 
i gone from bad to worse under his regime; law and order were 
practically unknown. The Platt Amendment to the treaty of 1903 
gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba to preserve 
independence and maintain a government which could guarantee 
life, property, and individual lib~rty.26 However, Roosevelt and 
Hull were determined to carry out their policy of nonintervention 
and in the interest of that policy, despite the efforts of some 
quarters to force the issue, they steadfastly refused to send 
Marines into Cuba. 
A United Press dispatch27 appeared in the ~ ~ 
Times stated that the administration was standing on its policy 
of nonintervention and that Welles was "cooperating with the var-' 
ious political factions in an effort to prevent further blood-
!. shed. "28 
26 Hull, Memoirs, I, 312-313. 
27 The United Press Associations serve 1004 newspapers 
in the United States and 967 foreign papers. This is a total of 
~971 papers. This data was secured from the United P~ess office 
In New York in answer to a letter of inquiry to the writer. 
28 ~ ~ ~~, August 9, 1933, pt. 1, 2:4. 
I 
r 
I 27 
I The Chicago Daily!!!! in a dispatch from Fred. Reed, I staff correspondent in Washington, said that a department officiaJ 
I 
I 
maintained that intervention would not be necessary because this 
. . 
l 
I 
I 
I 
official was sure that Welles'~1:ould persuade Machado that nhis 
. 29 . . • I if 
time is up.n This action on the part'of Welles could certainly 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
be interpreted as a type of interference and in opposition to the 
principles of Hull. 
Roosevelt appealed to Cuba to submerge its political 
differences and to establish a government Which could maintain 
law and order and guarantee life and property. A New York Times 
- --------
article interpreted this as an nappeal as urging Machado to quit 
f I if necessary.n30 I The Chicago Daily ~ editorial of August 10th accused 
I 
Machado of spreading propaganda to the effect that the United 
States was interfering in the affairs or Cuba. The paper stoutly 
defended the position or Welles and the Roosevelt administration. 
, 
The editorial said: "Both Welles and the Roosevelt adminis-
tration have displayed such extreme solicitude for Cuban rights 
and ••• for Machado's prerogatives that there is not the 
. . 31 
slightest excuse for that sort of propaganda." The editorial 
29 Chicago DailI ~, August 9, 1933, pt. 1, 2:5. 
30 ~ York Times, August 10, 1933, pt. 1, \l:~. 
31 Chicago Dailz ~, August 10, pt. 1, 16:1. 
, 
, \ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I also commented on the fact that some Lati~ Americans will ma~e 
i t f ' the most of the Cuban situation to spread prejudice against ~e 
United States and thus "block Pre~ident Roosevelt's program for 
-' 32 
more cordial relations between the American peoples'." 
The ~ ~ Times said that the diplomats of Latin 
America discussed the possibility of intervention-. They agreed 
that such a step by this country would be an unpopular move 
throughout Latin America. Such a move would go far to "counter-
act the good effect of the agreement to evacuate our Marines from 
Haiti. "33 
An editorial appeared in the Chicag~ Daily Tribune 
which credited the government in its ac,tions in the Cuban affair; 
it stated the American government has been "approaching the situ-
ation for several months with as much discretion as possible. 
The administration • • • desires to avoid extreme action which 
could be taken under an interpretation of the Platt Amendment."34 
, . 
The days came and went but the Chicago Daill ~ 
covered the Cuban crisis watchfully. An editorial accused 
Machado of hoping for armed intervention in the belief that such 
intervention would strengthen his cause and keep him in office. 
\ 12:1. 
I 
32 ill.£. 
33 ~ ~ Times, August 10, 1933, pt. 1, \1~,7. 
34 Chicago Dail! Tribune, August 11, 1933, pt. 1, 
\ . 
, 
29 
However, the Department of State was too astute to fall into that 
line of reasoning. The editorial pointed out that- the adminis-
tration has attempted to further good will in Cuba by the Roose-
. ..
relt program of economic assistance and the c?ntemplation of a 
~eciprocal tariff agreement, both of which have been hampered by 
~he political turmoil and strife in Cuba.35 
The sugar question loomed ominous in the Cuban sit-
~ation said the Chicago Daily News.36 This paper maintained that 
f~ugar may.have a "decisive influence upon the political as well s the economic future of the island republic and, possibly upon rhe whole future relationship of the United States to all Latin 
'\merica. ,,37 
Arthur Krock36 writing from Washington for the ~ ~ 
~imes believed that Hull "won his spurs" in the Cuban situation. 
~rock later awarded the spurs to Hull again for his work at 
.1ontevideo.2 o Krock added that the Department of State officials 
:elt that recent events had convinced them that Hull was being 
~ndermined in the State Department but his handling of the Cuban 
~risis has shown that he is determined "slow to action, but when 
L 
35 Chicago Dai1l~, August 14, 1933, pt. 1, 10:1. 
36 Ibid., August 17, 1933, pt. 1, 16:1. 
37 I!?i£. \ :-
3$ ~ ~ Times, August 17, 1933, pt. 1, 16:5. 
\. 
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he moves he moves·with force, courage' and firmness. n39 
During the Cuban crisis, Mr. Hull was i·n communication 
i with the ambassadors of Latin ~erica; he consulted with thell 
before any action was taken by the State Department which would 
be of any interest to them or affect them. This policy was ad-
vantageous because it strengthened our hand with the Latin Am-
ericans and caused much less resentment than if we had acted, 
alone without co~su1tation with our neighbors.40 
On September 6th, the President after conferring with 
representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile .and Mexico issued a 
statement regarding the Cuban situation. He clearly stated that 
information about Cuba would be available to the Latin American 
,countries; he also made it clear that we had no desire to inter-
! 
vene and Cuba should obtain a satisfactory government of its 
o\m. 4l 
The Chicago Daily Tribune reminded its readers that 
"Disorders are a reflection on Uncle, but anything done to help 
out is a cause for reproach. n42 True to its isolationist poli-
cies the editorial added that the lesson of Cuba should teach the 
14:2. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Hull, Memoirs, I, 314. 
41 lli.£. \ 
42 Chicago DailX Tribune, November 13, 1933, pt. 1 
, 
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nited States something in regard to the Philippines, "princi-
pally either to stay in, or, in getting out, get out bag and 
"43 paggage. 
, 
Edi torial comment inthe Chicam Daily News44 urged a 
eturn to the pre-Wilsonian policy of recognition for a foreign 
government which demonstrates the sovereignty of the government • 
. ince de facto recognition has been a policy of the United States 
~ince earliest times, it does not seem that this advice is unsoun 
rt this time. The Chicago Daill Tribune concurred in this opin-
.·lon of recognition of Cuba's government in an editorial cri ti-
ising Welles' actions in Cuba and suggested that American diplo-
ats not be allowed to play one faction against ·the other.45 
(elleS denied that he had used any pressure or influence in Cuba 
~hich could be construed as interference or intervention.46 
In the latter part of November Roosevelt issued a state-
ent of policy in which he declared Washington stood ready to 
, 
.ecognize any government Which demonstrates itself representative 
43 
44 
45 rl,.:l. 
. 46 
~)cpt'.rtment of 
,.935, 9-10. 
i 
~. 
Chicago Daily ~, November 21, 1933, pt. 1, 16.:1. 
Chicago Daily Tribune., November 25, 1933, pt. 1, 
Sumner Wel~es, Tw~ Years g! the Good Neigh~ Policy 
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,! of its'people and able to secure their support. The Chicag~ 
Dail'y News47 said that this policy should command··favor thro~ihou1 
Latin ~erica; it should dispel ~ome of the suspicions and preju-
dices our neighbors have. Here, then, ~as a return to the prin-
ciple of de facto recognition by the United States. 
As the months progressed conditions were far from satis-
factory in Cuba. The Chica~~ Dailz News48 suggested that some 
American business men would like to see the disorder grow in Cuba 
in order to force the United States to intervene. The paper 
despaired of such intervention because nothing would be gained 
from intervention and certainly intervention would not fit the 
Cubans for self-government any more th~n intervention had e-
quipped any other country for self-government. 
On January 26, 1934 the Chicago Daill News ran an edi-
torial in which the paper commented that the Cuban situation had 
been handled in a sympathetic manner a?d that if the Cubans 
failed to "improve the responsibility cannot fairly be placed on 
the vfuite House. n49 The editorial also ~entioned that some eco-
nomic aid was probable for Cuba. 
47 Chica~~ Daill ~ November 25, 1933, pt. 1, 10:1. 
48 ~., December 21, 1933, pt. 1, 16:2. 
49 Ibid., January 26, 1934, pt. 1, 18:1. \ 
\ . 
, 
_-----------'l=-'--.-------W-'-dH ______ ~·1 __________________________________ __ 
___ .. ..--. -. ... • 't • 
... 
33 ' 
Finally 'a treaty was Signed with Cuba May 24, 1934. By 
i 
this treaty we gave up the right to intervene in euba thus com-
pletely abrogated the Platt Amendment. This proved that what 
Hull said he meant--nonintervention in the affairs of our neigh-
bors. 
The Detroit ~ Press paid tribute to Hull in an edi-
torial which commented: "The patience and restraint he displayed 
in the face of a difficult situation in Cuba is but one example 
of a policy of good neighborliness which has regained for the 
United States the confidence and good will of other American re-
publics. ,,50 
As late,as January 24th, 1935, the Chicago Daily ~­
une51 denounced the efforts we made in Cuba. The Tribune main-
-
tained that we have tried control, we have tried advice. We 
abrogated the Platt Amen~ent. Our only measures of success were 
, 
in the field of sanitation and health., The Tribun~ inferred that 
,perhaps American manipulation had contributed to the disorders in \ 
Cuba. According to the editorial,["~uba Heads for the Jungle", \: 
is the title of the editorial:1"Cuba is sliding back into the 
semi-barbarism or complete barbarism of'jungle society.,,52 
1- . 
I nocember 
) 10: 2. 
I 
50 Detroit Free Pres2, 
2, 1934, pt. ~:b. 
52 Ib.~. 
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Regardless of the state of society in Cuba, it does not 
seem that the Chicago Dailz Tribun~ need have used such terms to 
discuss the situation. It appear.s to be a case of bad judgment 
.--
and a lack of courtesy to use such oppobrious language in discuss 
ing one of the very neighbors we hoped to win to our Good Neighbo 
policy. Such an editorial can only hope to alienate our neigh-
borsl 
Prior to all this the Seventh International Conference 
of American States was held in MOntevideo in December of 1933. 
This Conference is significant because it laid the ground work fo 
future cooperation between the American republics. The outlook 
vIas not too favorable for the Conference because of the failure 0 
the London Economic Conference and the Geneva meeting for militar 
disarmament. 53 
President Roosevelt regarded the meeting to be one of 
great importance, an opportunity to f~ther understanding and 
accord among the Americas. With this in mind he directed Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull to attend in person. 54 On the way to \, 
lthe Conference Hull stopped at various ports of call to establish 
'personal contact and relations with the statesmen of the various 
L 
I 
i 
i 
!YOrk, 
53 Hull, Memo~r~, I, 317. 
5 It- \Vilfred Funk, ed., ]?ooseveltts Foreir;l1 P;)licy, New 
191~2, Item 19, 28-29. 
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countries. Both Roosevelt and Hull ,had the highest hopes for the 
success of the Conference and Hull did not lose a'· single oppor-
tunity to further the cause of the Good Neighbor policy from the 
time of his appointment to he'ad the U~ ted States delegation unti"1 
he returned home. 
I 
Hull expressed himself on the forthcoming Conference in 
his Addresses ~ Statements saying, that a "more substantial 
step forward in Pan American unity can and ••• will be taken at 
¥mntevideo than all others within two decades.";; He realized 
full well that there were impediments to the success of the 
Conference but he was confident that it could be brought to a 
successful conclusion. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia protested that 
the time was not ripe for the Conference. 56 Argentina was partic 
ularly adamant and until the very end could not make up her mind 
to send a delegate to attend the Conference. 
Hull was anxious to present to the Conference an eco-
nomic resolution for lower tariffs and the abolition of trade '\1 
restrictions. Fundamentally the program57 provided for a tariff 
1935, 7. 
5; Cordell Hull,Addresses ~ Statements, \'lashington, 
56 Hull, ~oi~~, I, 317. 
57 llli., 320. 
\ 
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, 
truce: the initiation or bilateral orplurilateral negotiations 
for the removal or restrictions on commerce and reductions or 
tariff rates. Governments were ~o try 'tc> eliminate restrictions 
and duties which clearly lacke'd economic justification. The 
governments were also to agree to incorporate in these "trade 
agreements the most-favored-nation principle in its unconditional 
and unrestricted form, this to be applieq to all forms and meth-
ods of control of imports and not only to import duties."58 In 
preparing the resolution Hull says he hoped the whole world could 
be included in the idea; it was not to be confined to the New 
World alone. "Measures like my economic resolution could have 
,been applied as logically to the Eastern Hemisphere as to our 
own. n59 
Regarding this economic resolution the New York Times60 
, -----~-
in an editorial stated the fact that although Hull may not be 
forbidden to pursue his work on trade agreements, he cannot hope 
, ' 
to bring it to function unless there is a change of attitude on 
the part of the President. An~ change the President's attitude 
he did. 
The delegation arrived at Montevideo on November 2$, 
5g Ibid. 
-
59 lli.£., 321. \ 
60 ~ ~ Times, November 11, 1933, pt. 1, 14:3 • 
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I I to find nthe atmosphere or 'ambiente' as the local press des-
"
. cribed it, was excited and not too promising. n6l Hinton contende 
that the "Chaco War, North American efforts to collect defaulted 
i \ 
bonds, the threat of intervention in Cuba, and the presence of th 
Uni ted States Marines62 in Nicaragua would 'c'ombine to throw a 
chill over the gathering." Hull hastily took counsel with his 
political self and decided positive action was needed. 
The attitude toward Hull upon his arrival at Montevideo 
was not a warm one. He was treated with suspicion and distrust. 
The newspapers of Montevideo and Buenos Aires "rawhided our coun-
try and our delegation, called us names,. and-threw out the idea 
that we were down there as usual, for purely selfish narrow pur-
poses."63 The Brazilian press hailed Hull as the first repre-
sentative of President Roosevelt's New Deal to visit Latin Ameri-
ca. They expressed the hope that Hull's visit would bring about 
an understanding between the United States and Brazil and some 
, 
solution of the economic problems of the two countries.64 
-
61 Hinton, Cordell ~, 245. 
62 Hinton is misinformed on the fact of the r,1arines 
toeing in Nicaragua. The Marines were withdrawn after the 1932 
i~J-ections and the last \-"lera evacuated on January 2, 1933. See 
,);)}-,,!..Ci: !:1.r;~?:E..::::,c., 1933,. New York, (no publication date), 689. iUSO 
12 '';0 ~ ~ IntornD.;t~onal ~~, 1933. 
I 63 Hull, M,emoirs, I, 324. \ ~ 
64 ~. ~ Time~, November 25, 1933, pt. 1; 3:1. 
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Hull called on the delegations in Montevideo without 
making an appointment. These informa~ calls usually lasted thir-
ty to forty minutes and created a. better feeling and paved the 
way for closer cooperation. Hull always tried to impress the 
delegations with the fact that we were there .with the firm intent 
to carry out the doctrine of the good neighbor. We simply wanted 
to cooperate fully with all Latin American countries in promoting 
the political and economic ideals in which we are all alike and 
mutually interested.65 These informal 'calls created a feeling of 
friendliness and warmth that a more formal approach could not 
have created. 
Argentina preeented a problem. Even before the meeting 
Ibegan the ~ ~ Times predicted ~~t Argentina would "assume 
leadership of South American affairs and organize a regional 
South American bloc, opposed to the United States. n66 It is a 
fact that Argentina opposed our actions for some time and has-
, 
tened to organize her sister republics against us whenever she 
could possibly do so. Hull had set his heart on unity of action \, 
at the conference,67 so, undaunted he called on the Argentine 
,delegation headed by Saavedra Lamas. He received Hull nervously 
65 Hull, Memoir~, I, 326. 
66 New York Time~, November 12, 1933, pt. 1,\20:1. 
67 Hull J lV~cr.1oirs, I, 327. 
'9 
ut Hull outlined his plans and thereby appealed to the vanity of 
.saavedra Lamas and asked his counsel as the head 0°! the Argentine 
elegation. Hull told Saavedra Lamas of his plan on two resolu-
tions, one pertaining to an economic program for business recover 
and the other pertaining to the peace treaties. Hull then pro-
rosed that Saaverlra Lamas should present the resolution to the 
Iconference which pertained to the peace treaties and that Hull 
'would present the economic resolution. ,He told Lamas that if he 
did not care to propose the peace resolut~on that he would have t 
find the next best man to do it. After due consideration Saavedr 
Lamas accepted Hull's idea and consented to propose the resolutio 
acked by the support of the United States delegation.68 This 
cooperation between Hull and Saavedra Lamas was ffunexpectedff69 an 
"in sharp contrast to Argentina's antagonistic attitude toward th 
United States in previous confe~ences.n7Q 
In the following quotation, tpe reader can readily 
lunderstand the reason for Cordell Hull's triumph with Saavedra 
Lamas and also the reason for the success of his Latin American \, 
, 
I 
policy in general. He wrote: 
But I firmly believe in the principle that "there are 
no real triumphs in diplomacy". I felt that true success 
1---------! 68 ill.sl. , 327-329. 
\ \ 
69 ~ York .Timc~, December 11, 1933, pt. 1, 10:5. 
70 lli.Q. , December 10, 1933, 37:1. 
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could come only by inducing our opponents to become our 
allies through convincing them ~hat basically our ideas ~ere 
their ideas. • •• I could have introduced into the Confer-
ence the peace resolution I had prepared rather than give it 
to Saavedra Lamas and perhaps I could have secured a major-
ity in its favor. But, h..ad I' done so, Argentina doubtle~s 
would have fought it on some technical' grounds and the una-
nimity it needed would have vanished. I believed it ~~ser 
in the circumstances for the head of the Argentine delega-
tion to offer i t.·71 
Commenting on Hull's mission to Latin America the 
Chicagq Daily Tribune called it a "commendable official enterpris 
and we are confident will result in improvement in our relations 
with our South American neighbors.,,72 In the same editorial the 
Tri~u~ noted the ability of Hull as well as his integrity and 
,the sincere manner with which he attacked Whatever he undertook. 
Again commenting on the Conference and the report of an 
economic proposal, the Chicago Daily Tribune pOinted out that the 
decline in trade between the United States and Argentina is a 
considerable amount in dollars and cents. It is pointed out by 
the Tribune that bonds are defaulted by Latin American coun-
tries7; which injures not only America~ investors but also the 
iL~tin Americans· themselves; their credit will undoubtedly be ! .. 
jrestricted as a result of these defaults. The Tribune hastened 
Ito conclude: "If Mr. Hull nas a plan for reviving trade and can 
i 
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put his plan into successful operation, he will rate a monument i 
every Latin Americ~n capital as well as in Washington, D. C. n74 
Saavedra Lamas introduc~d his peace resolution and in 
accordance with their agreement, Hull seconded the resolution. 
In his speech, he pointed out that they were writing a chapter in 
the peace efforts of the Americas which would go down in history. 
He also mentioned the policies of the New Deal and assured that 
these policies would be strictly adhered to by the Roosevelt 
administration.75 
On December 12th, Hull made his economic proposal on 
trade revival and the reduction of tariff barriers through "the 
negotiation of comprehensive bilateral reciprocity treaties based 
upon mutual concession.n76 . Saavedra Lamas supported Hull's pro-
posal declaring that Cordell Hull had put his finger on the 
world's sore spot."?? This proposal o~ Hull's is rated by Wert-
enbaker as the "first positive United States contribution in , 
history to the doctrine of Pan Americanism. n7$ 
. '\ "....., co 
,.::::..::..:..:.:.::. , 
Harold Hinton in commenting on the work of Hull de- \. 
74 Ibid. 
-
75 Hull, Memoi~, I, 332-333. 
76 ~ ~ Time~, December 13, 1933, pt. 1, 19:2 •. 
77 Chicag.o Dai.l ... ~ News, December 13, 1933, pt.~l, 2:4. 
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clared that the United States and Argentina had made a trade with 
the proposals, as the United States had agreed to sUPP1rt the 
Antiwar Pact of Saavedra Lamas in return for Argentine support of 
Uni ted States economic leadership at the Conference. 79 If Hiriton 
made this statement as a criticism of Hull's work, it hardly 
seems to be a justifiable one in the light of diplomatic rela-
tions. 
An editorial in the New York Times titled "American 
--
,! Tariff Policy" said the Hull program looked to the future and 
must await a change in American tariff policy.SO The editorial 
pointed out the fact that the United States is attempting to 
! 
raise prices at home and any legislation dealing ,nth tariffs 
will depend on the success of the price-raising program or the 
inadequacies of such a program. However, the editorial con-
cluded that the tariff policy of the United States is Changing. S1 
The resolution was adopted., In an Associated Press 
re1ease$2 it was viewed as representing 'a change in the tariff 
79 ~ ~ Times, December 13,1933, pt. 1, 19:1.: 
80 ~., December 14, 1933, pt. 1, 24:2. 
I I $1 Ibid. I $2 ~Associated Press 'supplies 1700 papers in the 
jUnited States. Director~ of the Associated Press, privately 
Iprinted, 1949, 10=15. -- --- \ \ 
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olicies of this country. 83 Since no advers'e criticism accompan-
'ed the article it can be assumed that the chang~was acceptable. 
On December 19th a spe~ial cable for~,Montevideo sent 
by Harold Hinton told of the "'assurances made by Hull that the 
United States was definitely committed to a policy of noninter-
vention in the affairs of the Americas. The editorial concluded 
thus: "The declaration of a Chaco armistice and discussion of 
a nonintervention resolution called up expressions of amity and 
mutual respect such as no previous Pan American gathering has 
seen."84 
Hull along with others was credited with the Chaco 
e ' 
armistice. 5 In, another article of the same date, the ~ ~ 
Times pointed out that Hull came to Montevideo with a'definite 
plan of action for well-defined organized peace. Like a ~od 
executive or a good Tennessee politician, he has quietly suggest-
ed all his plans to others and let th~m introduce the projects 
and take the credit.e6 
I . IVl.ctory The'QPicago, Daily ~ credited Hull with a diplomatic at the Pan American Conference that "not only constituted 
I • 
j----------g-3---New ~ Time~, pecember 15, 1933, pt. 1, 2:2. 
84 Ibid., December 20, 1933, pt. 1, 1:3. 
e5 Ibid., 15:3. 
fi6 Ib:td., 15: 1. 
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a personal triumph but greatly improved United States relations 
and prestige in Latin America. nS7 In its editorIal column the 
J 
same paper commented on the succ,ess of Hull's policies at the 
Conference but added a note of warning that perhaps Hull's phi~ 0 
10sophy on tariffs may be met with some misconceptions on the 
part of our neighbors. It reminded its readers of the fact that 
the Congress of the United States shapes American tariff policies 
. SS 
and not the Secretary of State. The editorial concluded: 
The United States deserves better esteem from its Latin 
American sisters for its more liberal poliCies of the last 
few years. It has done much to allay suspicion by withdraw-
ing from Nicaragua and Haiti and other countries where it 
had intervened on less provocation. By redefining its posi-
tion on intervention and its interpretation of the !·1onroe 
Doctrine, it has indicated a disposition to respect the 
sovereignty of other countries. Such considerations should 
,·,eigh against any disillusionment 1!hich may arise from mis-
conception of the tariff policies. 9 . . 
Arthur Krock wrote from Washington for the ~ ~ 
Times maintaining that nHull won his spursn·at Montevideo making 
the President, Tennessee, and the Department of State proud of 
him. He went on to say that Hull has become the number one fig-
. go 
in the cabinet and a true exponent of the ,'alson policy .... 
87 Chicag~ Daily New~, December 27, 1933, pt. 1, 2:5. 
88 llil!. , December 28, 1933, pt. 1, 14:1. 
89 Ibid. 
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As the 'Secretary journeyed home he was warmly praised 
by many of the delegations from Latin America as'· a real peace~ 
maker and as the hero of Montevideo Confe~ence. A news item i~ 
the ~ .!2!!f Times from Panama City said: "Hailed by the local 
press as the 'standard bearer of peace', Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull of the United States, who arrived here this morn-
ing, ••• justified that designation. H91 
The ~ ~ Times quoted Dr. L. S. Rowe, director 
general of the Pan American Union in an article in February_ 
Dr. Rowe said the work of Hull particularly as a peacemaker, is a 
very important contribution to Pan America. He maintains that 
Hull's efforts at the Conference ushered in a new era in our re-
Ilations with the countries of Latin America. Dr. RO,\'ie said: 
I had occasion to visit these countries two weeks after 
Secretary Hull's visits. Hull visited Brazil, Argentina, 
Peru, Ecuador, ,Colombia, Panama and was deeply impressed 
with the new attitude of friendliness, confidence, and co-
operation characteristic not only of the government but also 
of the people. 
This feeling is that our relations with them are being 
approached from a new and more liberal angle and that the " 
United States is determined that those elements of our poli-
cy which in the past have given rise to criticism are either 
to be eliminated or fundamentally modified. The situation 
is o?e f:ough~ with deep significance for the future of Pan Amer~cam. sm. ';J 
91 lb~~., January 8, 1934, pt. 1, 10:1. 
92 Ibid., February 7, 1934, pt. 1, 6:5. 
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In his Memoirs Hull points that the eyes of Latin Amer-
ica were,: turned toward us to see if we meant to, carry out the 
'I agreement we had signed at Montev.!-deo as well as the policy of 
, " .~~-
the Good Neighbor. "We had reached a climax of cooperation at 
Montevideo. Any faltering on our part now would revive old sus-
picions and antagonisms as acutely as before, if not more so."93 
An Associated Press dispatch gives us some light on the 
press in Lima, Peru. The release is entitled "Press Lauds For-
eign Policy of Roosevelt". It points out that the newspaper ~ 
Icomercio 94 said Roosevelt's recent speech on foreign policy elos-
!es an irritating period i~ relations between the United States 
land other republics. It will lend to\"lard "development of sincere 
and useful understanding and postponement of suspicions originateq 
by certain methods previously employed in American international 
relationsn • 95 The use of the word postponement is interesting; 
apparently there seemed little hope tq postpone suspicion defi-
nitely. 
Upon his return to Washington· Hull conferred with the \. 
IPresident, then issued a statement emphasizing our diE::'.'\'o\'lal of 
93 Hull, ~~, I, 342., 
I 94 El Comercio, cited in Chi ca.go Herald and Excunincr, 
,December 31, 1~0), pt. r; 3:4. ---
I 
i \ 95 Ibid. 
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"all the old themes of conquest or armed intervention,,;96 it be-
came evident that solidarity of purpose of all the Americas could 
be attained. For the first time.there was no bloc working a-
gainst us. Of course, ~here ~as not complete harmony at the Con-
ference but on all major issues there was a unity not found in 
the Americas previously. 
Bemis, an authority on diplomatic history, hailed the 
Conference at Montevideo as a great advance in Pan Americanism, 
"particularly in regard to the organization of peace in the pres-
entation of which the nations of the New World had a common vital 
interest."97 He also mentioned the resolution on the removal of 
trade barriers, the treaties defining the nationality of women, 
the requirements of naturalization in general, and the convention 
defining the rights and duties of states as further accomplish-
ments of the Conference.9~ 
Bailey said that this Conference gave the Roosevelt. 
, 
administration the opportunity to "breathe greater reality into 
its Good Neighbor policy."99 He concluded his remarks with the 
96 Hull, Memoirs, I, 342. 
i 97 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic HistorI of the 
iYnit~ ~~, 3rd ed., New York, I950, 764-
i 98 Ibid. 
t ---I 99 Bailey, piPl2~~t~~ ~orz, 737. \ 
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observation that the Conference adjourned with "greater cordial-
'ty toward the United States than had'been eviden~ed at any of 
the six previous gatherings. nlOO 
An interesting note'--came from a Latin American, Luis 
'Quintanilla who said: "Hull. __ proceeded with utmost tact' and 
kindness. He succeeded first in dispelling suspicion and second-
ly in securing cooperation. nlOl Quintanilla went on to credit 
Hull and the Roosevelt administration, feeling quite confident of 
" 
their policies as long as the Roosevelt regime continued in offie 
out then brought up the question of What will happen with a 
change of administration. Quintanilla concluded: "The answer' 
rmPlies a faith in the United States, a faith which only time can 
justify_ At any rate, that Conference at Montevideo was ! repeat~ 
i 
. 
. . i P Am i . "102 a turn1ng p01nt n an er can1sm." 
Another view is expressed by Van Alstyn,e who commented 
that the Roosevelt administration was determined to make a realit) 
, 
out of Pan Americanism. Pan American was to be the "chief instru \ 
ment of hemisphere defense."IO) We could not get anywhere with 
100 Ib~. 
New 
'York, 
101 Luis Quintanilla, A Lat~ America~ QEeaks, 
1943, 159~160_ 
102 Ibiq., 229. 
\ ' 103 Richard W. Van Alstyne, Americnn D:Lplo!'1:1c\r in 
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police action, a continued intervention might lead to intrigue 
and cooperation in Europe, the only alternative was friendship. 
In 1933 the Roosevelt administrat~on began realistically to fore-
cast the future and to appraise the practical need for Latin 
American c,ollaboration in the face of possible foreign dan-
104 gers. 
The ~~ntevideo Conference brought prestige to Hull and 
praise from Graham Stuart. He claims this Conference was success 
ful because Roosevelt and Hull were agr~ed upon the Good Neighbor 
po1i~y and that the Department of State worked hand in hand ~~th 
Mr. Hull to accomplish the objectives of the Good Neighbor policy 
The Department of State had prepared Mr. Roosevelt's Pan American 
-Day speech of April 12, 1933 wherein Roosevelt def~ned his Good 
Neighbor policy "as possessing the essential qualities of a true 
Pan Americanism, and defined the MOnroe Doct~ne as a Pan America 
doctrine of continental defense. n105 Hull had helped draft the 
, 
plank in the Democratic platform of 1932 Which advocated no inter ' 
ference in the internal affairs of nations. Hull also had been 
,Qble to secure some support from Roosevelt on the resolution on 
!lovler tariffs and abolition of trade restrictions. Not only 
• 
iau1l 
1-
accomplished these things but Stuart credits him , ... -1 th person 
104 Ibid., 229. \ 
105 Stuart, Q££artme~ 2! State, 323. 
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al endeavors to win over the delegations and especially the proud 
arrogant Argentine delegates. Stuart praises the'"astute manner 
in which Hull won the cooperation ofdthe head of the Argentine 
delegation, Saavedra Lamas. 
Stuart .does not feel that Hull was well qualified for 
106 the office of Secretary of State yet he concedes Hull's accom-
plishments thus: "By submerging himself and the American dele-
gation in order to obtain wholehearted cooperative action for the 
welfare of all, instead of personal prestige and praise, Secre-
tary Hull made the Good Neighbor Policy a vital force for better 
I understanding. "107 
According to Wertenbaker, ~~ntevideo tore down our 
interventionist policy of a hundred ten years' standing. He com-
mends Roosevelt's backing of Hull's sta·nd on nonintervention and 
tariff reductions by negotiating with·the other nations. tfThis 
stone-in the policy structure enhances,the Secretary's prestige 
in Latin America at the expense of a good deal of criticism from 
108 high-tariff advocated at home." \, 
Another reliable comment is made by Arthur \'lhi taker who 
I said: 
, 
! , 
1-
106 ill..£., 310. 
107 ~., 324. 
108 • Wertenbaker, h. New Doctrine., 107. 
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• • • the first important stage in the emergence of the new 
inter-American cordiality came at the Seventh International 
Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933, when 
the United States surrendered the right of intervention, 
and18~e meeting ended in an ,atmosphere of friendliness.,. 
• • 
On December 28, 1933, the President addressed the 
\'loodrow Wilson Foundation and acclaimed Hull. In this Item 26, 
t1peace by Peoples Instead of Vlar by Governments, ff he prai sed the 
'i,:ork done at Montevideo and ended on a note of prai se for the 
Secretary of State whom Roosevelt credits with bringing about a 
friendlier atmosphere between the United States and our neighbors 
to the south. Roosevelt said: "For participation in the bring-
ing about of that result we can feel proud that so much credit 
belongs to the Secretary of State of the United States, Cordell 
Hull. ,,110 
Hull was satisfied with the backing he received from 
Congress upon his return from Montevideo. He was extremely 
pleased with the rapidity with which legislation was passed in 
Congress on the Chaco embargo, the Cuban treaty, Haiti, and the 
Argentine Anti"rar Pact. Hull said that these concrete evidences 
,Of Cong~ess showed they were convinced of the "validity of the 
,Good Neighbor Policy and the need to implement it ,'lith acts. nlll 
I 
I 
I 
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109 Arthur P. Whitaker, ed., Inter Americc.!1 Affc.irs, 
York, 1943, 6. ._, :-
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What did Cordell Hull himself feel had been accomp,lish-
ed at Montevideo? In an address before the National Pres~ Club 
in "lashington, he discussed this very ·point. Fir.st of all he 
f ~ 1JI f 
praised the people of Latin America for-their love of law, jus-
tice, and equality, for their courtesy, 'loyalty and kindness. He 
mentioned the inauspicious beginning of the Conference and the 
pessimistic outlook held by many before the Conference began, 
chiding the press somewhat by saying: " ••• some of·my friends 
of the press who were utterly pessimistic as to the outcome.r.ll2 
Hull pointed out the suspicions, prejudices and aloofness; and 
lack of concrete ,cooperation between the United States and Latin 
America in previous years. Hull claimed that the Conference 
marked the "beginning of a new era--a new epoch--in this hemi-
sphere."ll) A new spirit inspired by the policy of the good 
neighbor was born at MOntevideo. ll4 International cooperation 
twas demonstrated. A peace revival wa~ conducted through the 
;, entire proceedings.ll5 The trade and tariff steps were mentioned' 
i 
I 
! 
112 United States Department of State Press Release, 
Some Results of the Montevideo Conference, Address by Cordell 
RUl~, Series IB,-rublication No. 500, Washington, 1934, 2. 
, 113 Ibid., 3. 
114 lliJ1., 4. 
115 Ibi.d., 6. \ 
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with their possibility of international trade on a much wider 
scope.116 This sentence of the speech summed up the attitude of 
the Conference toward these trade problems: 
. 
• • • The Conference was --not content with a mere expression 
of disapproval, but it proceeded unanimously to propose a 
definite, concrete, and comprehensive program for economic 
rehabilitation which would combine a policy of mutually 
profitable international trade with such domestic economic 
policies and programs as each nation may desire to main-
tain. 117 
• • 
Our next concern is with the problem of Mexico. The 
'situation is frought with a number of misunderstandings on our 
part as well as on the part of our neighbor. One has only to ,1001 
toack through the years to see evidences of intervention of one 
\ 
116 !Ei£., 7. 
117 Ibid., 10. 
118 Hull, Addresse~ ~ Statemcnt~, 83. 
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kind or another which would naturally arouse suspicions of us. 
At times our choice of representatives. in Mexico had left much to 
be desired and undoubtedly these representatives have been the 
cause of some of the discord • .--. 
General Lazaro C~rdenas was elected in 1934. According 
, 
to ~, Mexico prepared to inaugurate Cardenas and suffered "a 
momentous change of heart, was thanking its stars for President 
J . 1 119 p. . Roosevelt and Ambassador osephus Da~e s. re~ous to the 
Cardenas inauguration there had been some criticism of the ap-
pointment of Daniels to the post in Mexico because he had been 
Secretary of the Navy at the time when the Navy bombarded Vera 
Cruz in 1914. ~ said the change of heart on the part of MexiC; 
was due to the fact that: 
• • • In Ambassador Daniels they have found the weigh-
tiest approver of Mexico's radical and ,anti-clerical Six-
Year Plan. He had called it roundly "a nm'1 deal and a 
square deal!" Roosevelt raised the price of silver. He has I 
also recognized the Soviet Union, c8nsidered by Mexicans the 
spearhead of all that is Godless.lf 
The storm clouds began to gather over Mexico shortly 
after the inauguration of C~rdenas. Commonweall21 said the re-
lports of an American newspaper man, who risked his life to bring 
lout documentary evidence, indicated a new revolution was going on 
i-----l .... 1-9-"I-1eXiCO" , Time, XXVIII, December 3, 1934, 21. 
I 
I 120 llli. 121 ltStorms Darken Over IvIexi co", 
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in Mexico. Bridges were blown up, trains delayed, tracks torn 
apart--tangible evidences of the stri~e and turmoil in Mexico. 
£o~~onweal urged its readers: 
••• Everything that ca~_properlybe done by American pub-
lic opinion should be exerted promptly and powerfully to 
avert the outbreak of another civil war in Mexico--but if 
those efforts fail, let it be remembered that no share of 
the bla~~2for such a tragedy may be justly laid upon the 
church. 
/ The problem of recognition of the new Cardenas govern-
ment was discussed in America under the title, "No Intervention 
in Mexico". Representative Higgins of Massachusetts asked for 
withdral'lal of recognition of Mexico. America said: 
Secretary of State Hull shows that he is not yet properly 
informed concerning the real burden of our complaint: It i 
is true Mr. Higgins asked for withdrawal of recognition, but 
even there Mr. Hull is not on firm ground, for one of the 
conditions of our recognition of Russia is a promise to re-
spect the religion of Americans in Russia, a thing "nich is 
not being done in Mexico. l23 
America pointed out that what American Catholics wanted 
is a cessation of intervention, even i~ recognition cannot or 
will not be withdrawn. The editorial pointed to the intervention 
ist tactics of Josephus Daniels as .listed by the Brooklyn Tablet: , 
Daniels is guilty of recognizing Calles as boss; of praising 
the National Revolutionary party which party was anxious to 
expel all Bishops and priests; of entertaining the Governor 
1?2 ~., 272. 
, T 
123 "No Intervention in Mexico tt, 
19, 1935, 342. ; I.: ~:lt'.nry 
t 
i _________________________________ ~ 
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. , 
of Puebla who had closed the churches in Puebla; of calling 
on Garrido Canabal, leader of the Red Shirts who are murder-
ing Catholics, and praising Canabal. 124 
America concluded: 
Now all this obviously constitutes intervention of the most 
efficacious kind. Mexico is not united behind the new pres-I 
i dent and the country is aflame "Tj. th revo 1 t. Every time l-'Ir. 
Daniels comes out with one of his praises of the Calles 
crowd, he is shouting to the world that he and his Govern-
ment are supporting them. Every Mexican on both sides rec-
ognizes this instantly. Apd they are right. We call for a 
stop to this intervention. l25 
Since the United States had pledged herself to the policy of non-
intervention, bmerica felt that we were entitled to demand that 
intervention such as practiced by Daniels be stopped at once. 
~ Sundal Visitor carried an article in which the I 
resolution presented by Senator Wagner to the Senate is discussed.' 
The resolution demanded "that the United States suspend trage re~ 
lations with Mexico and urge tourists not to visit that country 
because of 'atrocities' against Catholics."126 This resolution 
vms framed by the Knights of Columbus 9f New York who charged 
"the Mexican Government is substituting atheism and communism for 
~Christianity and slavery for freedom.~127 The Knights of Colum-
t 
IbUSObjected to Daniels' actions in supporting the National Revo-
1------
i 124 !2i£. I 125 Ibid. 
I 126 ~'l~r.: ",Sunda,I V:tsitor, Huntington, Indian~, \January 
127, 1935, pt. 1, 1:1. 
I 127 Ibid. 
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lutionary Party of Mexico as well. 
In an article in ~ ~ World, a report was made of thi 
denunciation of the persecutions in Mexico by members of congreSSi 
It stated that precedents for .~ntercession had been inserted in 
the Congressional Record as well a~ a bill directing the Secreta!1 
not to enter into any reciprocal trade agreements or understand-
ings with any nation engaged in religious or raci~l persecu-
tions. 12$ 
Senator Borah proposed a resolution that an inquiry be 
Imade by the United States Senate regarding the state and Church 
situation in Mexico. This was said to be an intrusion by some 
IIIexican officials. According to the Chicago Daily Tribune these 
officials felt that the Borah proposal was un\'lOrthy of consider-
ation.129 The officials of Mexico pointed out that such an in-
quiry would mean interference in the internal affairs of a sov-
ereign nation; such an interference could lead to serious inter-
Inational consequences. Despite the fact that Borah represented 
,the sentiments of a large number of United States citizens it 
i "does not diminish the resentment here U;-lexicq] that Uni ted Stat 
I 
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authorities be requested even to. take consideration of any action! 
d o M. ° "130 regar ~ng e~can sovere~gnty. 
America objected to the agitatiorx of the New ~ Times 
,; 
and the World-Telew:::am over the.._proposed Bot'ah resolution. Amer-
-
iea maintai'ned the reporting on the Mexiean situation had been 
-
the poorest in modern times131 and, therefore, the full facts in 
the case were not kno~m to the public. America felt that objec-
--
tions to looking into the Mexican situation need not be based on 
a "mere legalistic point of international comity which forbids 
too wh • h "13 2 Am ° 
'any peer~ng ~nto at goes on ~n anot er country. er~ca 
said: 
The truth is that this Mexican question is an American 
question, an American question of the most domestic kind. 
• • • As a matter of fact, we think that Senator Borah • • • 
has proposed a signal service to amicable relations with 
Mexico, and all of Latin America, whose irritations against 
us is growing, faster than is American irritation against 
Ivlexico. A hush-hush policy will simply not work. The thing 
has gone too far. 133 
~ Sunday Visitor reported 09 the reply received by 
!Representative Higgins of ~~ssachusetts when he again urged the 
recall of Daniels and that the United States withdraw recognition 
130 
1 I 131 
~1935, 437. 
I 
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133 
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of Mexico. Secretary Hull said: " ••• it is not within the 
, rovince or this Government to intervene in the sit~ation in Mex-
COe n134 No comment was made by this paper as to the need for 
!.l 
intervention nor was any comment-made that the United States 
Arguments were given by 't~e Knights of COlumbuJ 
'
should intervene. 
to Mr. Hull that a warning should be given ,to Mexico that diplo-
! 
~atic relations would be severed unless persecution of Catholics 
an Mexico was stopped. To this Hull again ans't1ered that he would 
/3.dhere to a policy of nonintervention.13; 
r During this period there was a demand for investigation, 
~nterrerence, inquiry and intervention on the part of many people I 
~n the United States, Catholics as well as Protestants. Arch-
! riShOP Curley condemned the ~ignoble silence of the United States, 
[dth regard to the events in Mexico. n136 According to Archbishop 
furley, it was estimated that over a million resolutions and 
~etters had been sent to Roosevelt and Hull protesting the events 
on Mexico.137 Archbishop Curley accused'Hull of creating a new 
eparture in American diplomatic practice when he refused to ex-
a protest to the Mexican Foreign Orrice.138 The Archbishop 
134 ~ Sunday Visitor, February 3, 1935, pt. 1, 2:3. 
135 Ibid. 
-
136 Catholic nail:! Tribune" Dubuque, ~~.' >:~, .'. '30 & 
~-935, pt. 1, 10TT:" - , 
137 Ibid. 
-1 ~ r"- Til'· ,·1 
___ J .J .... _ .. ~ .'M .-..'~ .,. 
_____ • __ ._ ... 0iII."_~.,~ ... iiJ~------------------____ _J 
\, 
-60 
said Mexico is "not carrying out the part of the 'good neighbor' 
lelationship, "139 as long as it adopts. a cours~ c~unter to ,the 
IAmerican principles of fundamental rights of consc~ence and free-
dom of religion. 
~b~ 
The Knights of Columbus wrote to ROOsevelt and Hull· 
about the religious persecutions in Mexico. In Roosevelt's orig-
inal letter sent to the Knights of Columbus he said: "In respect 
to the rights enjoyed by Mexican citizens living in Mexico it has 
been the policy of this government to refrain from intervening in 
such direct concerns of the Mexican Gover~ment. That policy of i 
Inon-intervention I shall continue to pursue."140 The Knights of J 
IColumbus ansl'lered sharply and reminded Roosevelt of his respon-
dbili ties and denied that they sought intervention •• Instead the;.! 
~aintained they asked that the Government of the United States 
remonstrate on behalf of those persecuted.141 
On the same point, the Catholic Dai1X Tribun~ reported 
Ithe reply made by Roosevelt and stated:' Mr. Roosevelt made it 
,clear that his stand was not to be interpreted as evidence of in-
I 
iiifference and reiterated his abhorrence of religious intolerance, 
- . 
139 fE..~o 
I~: 2. 
1/1-0 Chicc;,g£ Dai\y ,lribune, December 1$, 1935, pt. 1, 
141 Ibid. 
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whether here or abroad. n142 
Commonweal143 commented that ~ose~eltts policy of non-,. 
intervention will comfort any nation which d~nies or minimizes 
~ 0 
religious liberty. 
.--
~ Brooklyn Tablet said that Roosevelt's stand on re-
ligious persecution in Mexico will "probably result in increased 
vengeance, tt and the government there will ttprobably nOli feel free ( 
to go ahead and slaughter everyone seeking to worship Almighty 
God. ttl44 
Hubert Herring writing for the Chronicle 2! Worlq !!-
fairs maintained: 
In the meantime, let the United States keep its hands 
off. I would even express the hope that American groups 
would deny themselves the rather dubious pleasure of pro-
testing. It vdll do them no good, and it only serves to 
complicate a situation which, I am convinced, will me~d if 
£.'lexico is permitted to order her affairs in her Oi'm way.n145 
The New York Timesl46 reported in April 1937 that a 
-~ ... ....... 
possible obstacle to complete relationa of a friendly nature be-
l 
142 Catholiq Daill Tri~~~, November 19, 1935, pt. 1, 
l/t3 COmmOn\llea~, cited in the ~holic Daily Tribune, 
4, 193;, pt. 1, 4:3. 
11t h The Brooklyn Tablet, cited in Ibid. 
Chronicle of li?.£1.Q Affair...§.,' January 4, lS36, 
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Ilv6 ~ Yor!( rr:imcs, April 14,,1937, pt. 1, J-}:4. 
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tween the United States and Mexico was removed when Secretary of 
State Hull and Dr. Najera signed a treaty ,providing for the ter-
t 
, 
mination of Article VIII of the Gadsden Treaty of 1$53. Thi~ ar-
ticle provided for the building of a plank and railroad across the 
sthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico considered this article an abridg 
. ent of her sovereignty. In pursuance of the Good Neighbor policy 
ChiCh strove to eliminate trouble spots, the termination of this 
article pointed to, better and more amicable relations. 
In January 193e, Hull protested the fact Mexico had fel 
t::>bliged to raise international trade barriers just when other na-
tions were finding it possible to lower them.147 However, becaus 
of Hull's policy of noninterference and amicable relations no rep 
esentation of any kind would be made to the Mexican Government 
i·mtil a complete analysi s of the decree had been made by ex-
ertso14$ 
An interesting article appeare~ in the Saturday Evening 
. . 
Post called "Revolution on a Silver Platter". Commenting on 
ICardenaS and his relations with Washington the article said: 
Washington, embarking upon a still undefined policy of 
being a "good neighbor", looked on social reconstruction 
with a friendly eye; and this was of primary importance. It 
is axiomatic in Mexico that no chief executive ;an long hold 
l __ 
I 147 ~., January 22, 1938, pt. 1, 2:8. 
\ 
\, 
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office unless the White House approves. This' has been prove ., 
time and time again; in recent days during the terms of 
Venustiano Carranza,. Alvaro Obregon, and Calle~. All these 
men received ~fuite House support w~en they were in danger, 
and all survived. The New Deal was not merely friendly to 
Mexico; it went farther than' simply keeping hands off l·:erica 
affairs. It embargoed arms for W9uld-be enemies. Later a ' 
new innovation, it bought Mexican silver at well over the 
market price and Mexican metal generally, permitting pegging 
of the pe so, gi ving Mexi co added purchasinf'"l... pO\'ler, and t~e 
government 13 per cent of its totalincome:149 
In commenting on the land grab \~ich had taken place in 
Mexico, the ~ writer said: 
Nevertheless, it may be that our State Department was 
wise in adopting the attitude that the land program should 
be encouraged and no immediate payment demanded for the 
United States citizens' lands seized. In this connection, 
Washington accepts the Mexican view that kmerican landowners 
acquired their Mexican holdings on a shoestring and made big 
profits for years •••• 
On the other hand, Washington could have slowed some-
what the agrarian program, or held it in safer bounds, by 
protecting Unite~ States landowners Who have had vast hold-
ings in Mexico.l,O 
It must be remembered in dealing with this problem of 
expropriations of oil and farm lands that the United States agree 
to the right of Mexico to expropriate and that Mexico agreed to 
our demand for compensation for properties.seized. Despite the \, 
impatience of those affected there was an amicable attempt on the 
part of the State Department to obtain justice for those whose 
149 Frank L. Klu.ckhohn, tfRevolution on a Silyer 
C~~urday Evening p~, CCX, February 5, 19J5~ 17. 
150 Ib~i., 710 
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lands and properties had been seized. 
The ~ writer added this comment on our diplomatic 
olicy: 
Where Washington appears to have fallen'down c"omp'1ete).y; 
however, particularly from the viewpOint of being a "good 
neighbor" to Mexico, has been in countenarrcin~, and even 
encouraging, an intensified campaign against foreign in-
dustry. For many extreme steps that President Cardenas took 
in this direction were followed by general laudatory speeche 
by Ambassador Josephus Daniels. • •• His friendly speech-
es might have had a useful effect had they been followed by 
an occasional bit of common-sense advice. They "lere not, 
howeveri· probably because of diplomatic policy set at home. 15 
The Post noted the demands of Mexico that the oil com-
-
panies would be forced to pay royalties on all their properties 
which upset the Morrow-Calles agreement guaranteeing the oil com-
panies rights in Mexico.152 
The next step was the oil expropriations! 
, 
Cardenas signed a decree in November, 1936, which pro-
r~ded for the expropriation of private property of public utility 
fO satisfy collective necessities in case of war or interior up-
,:leaval. Actually the program to drive out the petroleum interest ... 
i"~OOk the shape o·f most burdensome labor legi slation. Tacitly thJ 
Icardenas Government encouraged the labor unions to strike ab~inst 
151 !£i£., 71, 73. 
152 73. 
\ 
\, 
65 
the foreign o\v.ned companies for heavy increases in pay, shorter 
'hours, double pay for overtime, 
!held the unions on every demand 
IthOUgh costs had been driven to 
• • • • 
n153 The labor court~ up-
and the foreign companies, a1-
prohibitive levels, agreed to the 
demands except those which dealt with the control of books and 
management. Because the companies refused to accept the complete 
, I 
:demands, Cardenas decreed March 18, 1938, the expropriation of 
their properties.154 
I,' The Chicag? Daily ~, in discussing the oil expro-
priations, said the Secretary of State declared,forcibly that the 
ltUni ted States intends to defend its citizens and their legi ti!!latJ]' 
interests, in any part of the world, to the full extent allo\'led 
by the limits of reason. n155 In concluding the editorial the New 
said: "The 'good neighbor' policy is undoubtedly admirable. It 
presupposes, however, that we have good neighbors. n156 
The Chicag2 Daily Tribune featured an article written 
Iby Arthur Sears Henning. He said the 6il seizures have strained 
I 
" 
the relations betwe~ the United States and ;'!c:d co. Henn:Lrr:: , 
jPointed out the United States did nO,t dispute the authc~ity of 
I 153 154 
155 
156 
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Mexican Government to expropriate any properties within her boun-
daries, but we did demand just compensation. Mr. ~enning said 
the crisis 
• • • is not due entirely·to the expropriations of the Amer-
ican oil wells and refineries or to the previous action of 
the Mexican government in raising the Mexican tax to a pro-
hibitive degree on products imported chiefly or exclusively 
from the United States. The expropriations of the oil 
properties presented the United States with a cumulative 
grievance, coming on top of the expropriations in the last 
decade of hundreds of farms, ranches, and other agricultural 
properties owned by Americans, few of them eI~~ have been 
fully compensated by the Mexican government. )/ 
,Mr. Henning noted 'that the administration had done nothing but 
make representations to Mexico on account of the "good neighbor" 
policy until this expropriation of oil interestso In other ''fords 
the farmers and ranchers were not really supported in their 
claims although Mexico agreed to compensation; very few claims 
were ever satisfied.158 
The Chicago Daily ~ reported there was hope of 
settling this oil situation amicably because of the neighborli-
, 15 · 
ness which Cardenas showed in his message to the United States. 
The Latin American branch of 
lor a satisfactory adjustment 
the diplomatic corps was confident 
according to the ~. 160 
!--------
I 
I 
157 C,hicagQ Daily Tribune, March 31, 1935, pt. 1, 5:2 •. 
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The Chicago Daill Tribune said editorially that "Mexico 
has no reason to anticipate an unsympathetic response in Wash-
.. 
ington to the seizure of the foreign owned oil properties. • 
161 
• • The Tribune said the ~overnment here sanctions such ac-
tions and practices as for example in the case of TVAo 162 
The Tribune also reported to its readers from its Wash-j 
ington bureau that the oil case will test the Good Neighbor poli-
cy. The Tribune was able to point to the New Deal philosophy 
saying: "From motives not only of good neighborliness but of 
sympathy with the economic and social new deal that President 
Icirdenas is giving Mexico, Mr. Roosevelt declined to take the 
',British course. • •• He conceded the right of Mexico to ex-
16 1 
Ipropriate the properties and early requested just compensation. 
The article concluded that unless the Mexican Congress made a 
nore impressive provision to compensate the oil companies than it 
ldid to indemnify the owners of expropriated farm lands, the "good 
neighbor policy will be badly bent. And if Mexico gives Japan a 
foothold in that country • •• , the question will arise whether 
\Franklin Roosevelt's good neiehbor policy is as efficacious as 
I 
161 Chicag,2, Dailx Tribull~, April 7, 1938, pt. 1, 12:2.1 
l 
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Mexico and that he has sent "skilled propagandists to canvass 
tral and South America. n168 According to Newsweek the oil firms 
o. 
and others with large holdings were alarmed and insisted the 
lIState Department has invited ,this development by failing to de-
mand restoration of oil properties as Britain has done. n169 
The ~ York Times ~~iter, Bertram D. Hulen, believed 
Hull was proceeding wisely in suggesting arbitration of the oil 
properties rather than using economic and diplomatic pressure to 
force compensation.170 Since arbitration is a fundamental prin-
ciple of our foreign policy it was a wise move on Hull's part 
despite the pressure that must have been put upon him by the 
o ' 
affected groups. Hulen felt that the Good Neighbor policy was 
~eing tested very severely in this situation of the oil expro-
priations. He ended his article: "However, should misunderstand 
ings arise that would lead to modification or virtual abanconment 
of the policy, that would be considered a regrettable but unavoid 
able consequence of the protection of ieg1timate American inter-
ests abroad."l?1 
168 nC&rdenas Bids Latin America Expropriate Alien 
Property," Newsweek, XVI, July 4, 193$, 13. 
169 lllio 
170 New ~ Time~, July 22, 1938, pt. 1, 1:1. 
171 L,?j..£. \ 
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Editorially the ~ ~ Times commented that Hull's. 
vigorous note to Mexico on the expropriationfo should dispose of 
Ithe charge that the State Department had been remiss in protect-
ing American property rights in Mexi co .172 HoW€ver, the Times 
! ,did not feel that the Good Neighbor policy demanded that we 
abandon our interests abroad to whatever measures other countries 
saw fit to use. 
Delbert Clark, who wrote for the ~ ~ Times, said 
that Hull's note to Mexico showed a firm attitude on the part of 
the administration on the matter of expropriations and despite 
the Good Neighbor policy it was necessary to forestall a wave of 
lexpropriations throughout Latin America. 173 Hull had chosen to 
stress the agrarian issues rather than the oil seizures because 
the· "issues of seizure of relatively small farm properties 
strikes a chord in the American breast. n174 Clark noted also 
that "foreign policy at all times must have domestic support or 
175 it inevitably falls." 
Ecuador backed Hull's stand and commented on his note 
, / \, 
,to Mexico in the nm'lspaper 1:elegrafo. nIt is the duty of all 
I 
172 f.~i.cl· , July 23, 1938, pt. 1, 12:2. 
173 Ibiq. , July 24, 1938, pt. 1, 3:1. 
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governments to pay the full value of the property expropriated. 
To act otherwise is an arbitrary abuse. of power. tt176 
,. 
The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that Costa Rica was 
imi tating Mexican expropriations and, like News\,leek, the Tribune 
tccused C~rdenas of promoting the idea of expropriations in other 
!Latin ·American countries. l ?7 It regretted the fact that the in-
I . 
vestors who have had their holdings taken cannot use the promises 
of compensation as cash. In conclusion the Tribune added that 
r
leXiCO could say that ttthe New Deal taught it how to deal with in 
vestments. tt17$ 
On August 26, 1938, Hull sent another note to Mexico del ~anding that Mexico stop seizing American owned farmlands without 
~proper compensation. This note was said to be the strongest this 
government had sent in recent years according to the Associated 
'~ress dispatch. l79 
:i 
The lli!!! ~ Times commented on the note in an edi toria ,I 
1S0 .j 
saying the note left Mexico ttwithout legal or moral support. tt 
176 
, 
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, The paper discussed Hull's failure to mention the oil property 
~mich had been seized because he feared accusations of dollar di-
plomacy and imperialism. The Times felt that .Hull should have 
. 
Idemanded the return of the oil property because it ·was quite evi-dent that Mexico was in no position to make compensation to the 
181 
oil companies for the properties seized. 
The Chicago Daily ~ stated in an editorial, nA Warn-
I ing to Cardenas", that if he continued his policies we would be 
I
,rorced to abandon the easy tolerance of the Good Neighbor poli-
182 
cy. 
I 
I
I Hull sent another note of 5000 words to Mexico late in i 
August regarding the expropriations. The~ York Times maintaini 
ed there was not a word in the note which could be taken as a ! 
threat nor could Uncle Sam be accused of bullying. The Times fel ~ 
that Hull was condemning the Mexican attitude only in an effort 
to save fundamental principles of Latin American policy, which in 
eluded the principles of nonintervention and co-equality based on 
an assumption nth.at each of the score of Latin American republics 
'·.,<,ould guard the .... lelfare of foreigners within their boundaries as 
i p."3 I the United States preserves that protection. n-L ' 
! 
181 
182 
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The efforts to settle the expropriations dragged on in-
to August of 1939 when the negotiatio~s broke down. The New York 
-
Times said that there were three horns to the dilemma which con-
. 
fronted Hull on the Mexican si~~ation. They were: 
1. The Good Neighbor policy must not be allowed ~o be viti-
ated by conflicts of commercial interest. I 
'. 2. Latin American must not be encouraged to think the uniteJl 
Istates will be unconcerned about expropriations. I 
3. European nations must not be convinced that they have ani 
unwilling and feeble champion in the United States.184 I 
The Times felt that the administration would continue to follow , 
its present policy of trying to reach an amicable solution be-
cause the New World could not afford to be divided in the light 
of the trend of world affairs at that time. l $5 
It was not until 1942 that a solution was found. \;nile 
the compensation was not adequate, nor was its payment prompt, 
the two countries were glad to settle the controversy because of 
:the threat to hemisphere solidarity from without. In reality the 
United States practically paid for the expropriated lands through 
the purchase of silver and stabilization of the peso and other 
Iconcessions. The New York Times said: 
--
"This is a dangerous pre-
184 ~., August 13, 1939, pt. 1, 13:1 
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cedent. The best that can be said for it is that it terminates a 
,troublesome controversy with 
tit is of vital importance to 
WJ.• th L to Am ° "186 a ~n er~ca. . 
a neighboring country at a time When 
,. 
maintain and strengthen relations 
1$6 ~., April 22, 1942, pt. 1, 22:3. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 
Following Hull's return from ~~ntevideo he became busy 
with his trade agreements. President Roosevelt was not too kind-
ly disposed toward Hull's trade proposal~ and philosophyl but as 
time went on Hull sensed that the President was beginning to show 
more interest in his trade philosophy. 
As early as 1916 Hull formulated the philosophy of trad 
which he tarried through his twelve years as Secretary of State. 
He said in his autobiography: 
But toward 1916 I embraced the philosophy I carried 
throughout my twelve years as Secretary of State, into the 
Trade Agreements, into numerous speeches and statements 
addressed t~ this country and to the world. From then on, 
to me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, 
trade barriers, and unfair economic competitions with war. 
Though reali zing that many other factors \1ere involved, I 
reasoned that, if we could get a freerflQ1..'l of trade--f:~ ':)r \ 
in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions--so I, 
that one country would not be deadly jealous of another anc I 
the Ii ring standards of all countries mi.:.;ht ri se, t!1creby , 
eliminating the economic dissati sfaction that breeds \13,r, we 
might have a reasonable chance for lasting peace. 2 
I-----------I---H-Ull, Me~~~, I, 353; also Stuart, Q~2~~~?ent £f ' 
1;'3~~~e~ 322; a~so Charles A. Beard, Am~;ricaI1 .E.<2r_e..i_£l! Pol~c): i.r.l ~ 
!;'.-:-"):..~' 19.>2-... 91~O, Nm'l Haven, 1946,10). 
2 Hull, ~~, I, 81. 
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No one can deny that Hull,:devoted much of his time and 
energy to the study of trade; always he adhered t~. the same idea--
prosperi ty depends on stable nation~ as wi!>ll as individuals. ie I 
contended nany policy tending "to disrupt trade relations impairs 
national security, leads to international misunderstanding and 
'finally to war.") Hull condemned high tariffs as a means of in-
ter!erence--a policy in direct opposition to his idea of noninter 
vention. 
Bertram D. Hulen, writing for the ~ ~ Times, dis-
cussed Hull and his political views on tariff and trade. He 
pointed out that Hull holds that "reciprocal commercial treaties 
based on mutual tariff concessions and, as nearly as possible, 
the unconditional favored-nation policy, if other governments will 
ag;ree, would greatly supplement the usual legislative method of 
tariff readjustment. n4 
The Chica~o Daily ~ contained a well-written in-
, 
ltelligent editorial in which was discussed Hullts trade policies •. 
~ 
;'2:'he editorial said that the blame for the tariff situation must 
lbe shared by both parties because they both joined in the log-, 
rolling. It pointed out that the United ,States is not the only 
I 3 F;ed Hixon, nCord Hull: Tennesnee Statesman", 
tj~ History, LI, r·1ay 1940, 26. 4 ~ ~ Tim~~, April 9, 1933, pt. 1, 7:1\ ~ 
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country guilty of economic nationalism; nearly all are guilty of 
this same economic nationalism. The only hope for complete recov 
,. 
ery lies in the resumption of trade according to this editorial. 
Every nation must give and tak~regard1ess of the selfish in-
terests of some producers. "The problem", said the ~, "is to 
discover the true national interest, and agree to admit such for-
eign goods as will not cause unemployment in this country, while 
creating employment in important export industries through sales 
lin foreign markets."5 All citizens, regardless of party, would 
II certainly be glad to support such a policy as' this one. l On April 30th the New !2r! Times carried a report on an 
I 
'address by Hull before the American Society of International Law. 
The subject was related to international economic rehabilitation.~ 
IThe report in the Times did not speak adversely of Hul!'s remarksf 
I ' 
. 6 
that the economic plight of the world was due to Trecor-ornic .. <{ar. tT 
Before the Conference at Montevideo he had proposed to 
, 
seek a trade pact with Brazil. An Associated Press dispatch 
I 
,quoted the reaction of the newspapers ~ Nacion and La Prensa on 
Ithe proposal. The dispatch said: "The newspaper Naci~n called 
I agreement on monetary and tariff problems a decisive influence 
i 
5 £hica~o Qaily~, April 11, 1933, pt. 1, 18:2. 
6 l~~ York Times, April 30, 1933, pt. 1, 12:1 
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upon Pan American economic unity.n7 TtThe newspaper Prensa con-
ceded that tpresident Roosevelt sees clearly that such unity can-
.-
not be borne without tightening cocrmercial ties. tn8 
'. At the Montevideo Conference Hull proposed that the ex-
cessive trade barriers be leveled to a reasonable degree. He 
.; urged that this be done by the adoption of 
bilateral reciprocity treaties based on mutual concessions I· 
to be entered into by nations of this hemisphere among them- I 
selves and others as well, and the second, by a proposed 
understanding vd th other important countries that '-Ie and 
they proceed simultaneously to bring down these trade 0 
barriers to a level dictated by a moderate tariff policy.~ 
On June 12, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the bill 
knovm as the Trade Agreements Act,10 which was ~eally an amend-
ment to the Smoot-Hawley Act. The President was authorized to ! 
enter into trade agreements with other countries without the need i 
of Senate approval or Congressional action. Under this act the 
!President could nincrease or decrease any of the Smoot-Hawley 
rQtes by as much as 50 per cent in ret~rn for adequate trade con-
Icessions from another country. nIl Reductions applied to coun-
, 
7 La Naci6n, cited in Q~fu~ pa~l.Y Tribun.~, November 
1933, pt.~~-i6:-1~ 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Pre!'lsa, 
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ci ted in Ibid. 
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tries that did not discriminate against us.' 
Naturally Hull was overjoyed at the 
79 
" ,~+:, 
success Jft~ 
i 
long, 
itter fight for lower tariffs and trade. He firmly ?nd sincere-
, 
1 
Y believed that the "basic approach of psace is the ordering of 
, 
, , 
he world's economic life so that the masses of people can work 
nd live in reasonable comfort. nl2 
The Department of State did a good job in explaining 
Lhe program to the American people according to Graham Stuart. l3 
members of the department gave addresses explaining every 
) hase of the program and this publicity was helpful when the pro- t 
gram came up for renewal. The success of the reciprocal trade 
rrogram was "a great personal victorY,for Secretary Hull over the 
reSOlute opposition of isolationists, protectionists and New Deal 
~rs, and in spite of the wavering support of an opportunist Pres-
'dent.,,14 Others called the trade program financially and econ-
mica1ly unsound, because it would turn the, favorable balance of 
trade to competing countries. 
The first trade agreement was signed with Cuba in Aug-
(st of 1934. Our trade with Cuba increased noticeably--"exports 
~o Cuba increased 129 per cent compared .;nth the last four months I ' 
12 I!?iS.., 364. 
13 Stuart, Qepartm~g! ££ State, 318. 
ll:_ ~bi9:.. 
\ 
\, 
. ,.----------_ ......... _---
I 
... 
eo 
of 1933 and our imports from Cuba increased 155 per cent. n15 The 
favorable balance of trade going to Cuba. 
In a special article by Harold Hinton from vlashington 
for the New ~ Times, Hull is heaped with praise for his eco-
nomic efforts. Hinton wrote: 
o •• The present attempt at·negotiating reciprocal 
tariff agreements, undertaken for the betterment of domestic 
business conditions, is perhaps the only orthodox and con- I 
servative plan which has taken place in the recovery program 
••• Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, whose quiet in-
sistence on the possibility of outliving economic national-
ism finally overcame the resistance of Raymond 11].01ey and 
other advisors of President Roosevelt, speaks of the project 
as a "step back toward economic unity." The eeonorr;ic sanity 
to "Thieh Mr. Hull refers is the revival of foreign trade 
which in 1929 enabled this country to sell $5, 0001000,000 
worth of goods abroad. Mr. Hull believes 2,500,00u families' 
could be taken off the relief rolls and put to gainful em-6 ployment if that sliee of business were obt~inable today.l 
An interesting editorial appeared in the ~ ~ Ti~es 
entitled "Slow Progress". It discussed the slow progress made in 
negotiating the trade agreements. By December 1934, twelve coun-
, 
tries had been added to the list of those seeking to conclude 
,trade agreements with the United States. They included Belgium, 
I 
! lS\veden, S ... n.tzerland, Spain, Brazil, Colombia, and several Central 
I 
IArr:erican countries. 
~ 
The editorial caustically remarked: "It is I 
i 
reassuring I, 
I 
~!)leasant 
, -
to see the list expand. But it would be more 
i 
I 
f 
i 15 Hull, i"1eE1ot~, I, 344; aLso Stuart, Latin ,\me-rica 
; ,::'.::1d t:~ c Uni. ·t.cd. Str\ te s. D+$ -r-\ ~ ...... 1 _ ___ ____ • _~~__ • 
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to have the announcement of an agreement actually concluded_"l? 
The editorial bemoaned the fact that by this date only one agree-
Iment had actually been concluded, namely Cuba. ,-
No reflection is cast upon Mr. Hull by the ~ York' 
iTimes, whom they grant, has worked untiringly and unwaveringly to 
I -
1secure the passage of the trade agreements but rather place the 
blame on the manufacturers who protest the· lowering of any tar-
iff.18 However, the ~ ~ Times did not feel that it was the 
ltime to abandon the plan and advocate a horizontal reduction of 
I lall duties. This same paper concluded: "But it must be con-
Iressed that the results achieved thus fa~ have been disappoint-
i 
~ingly meager particularly when it is remembered how long a time 
has passed since the advocates of reciprocity first described the 
I '9 I~necessi ty of tariff reform as 'urgent' and 'imperative t • t,':' I On December 23, the ~ ~ Times featured another 
jeditorial discussing Hull and his philosophy. The editorial said 
Ithat Hull's ideas "would fall upon unwilling ears in the Con-
!gress."20 Concluding with this statement, the Times left no 
I I \ , Idoubt as to its regard for Mr. Hull and his tariff program: 
17 Tb-: r1 ~., 
18 Ibid. 
--
19 .It:.tqe 
December 14, 1934, pt. 1, 22:1 
\ 
December 23, 1934, pt. 4, 4:1. 
I 
! 
i I 
, " 
Above all, the Secretary deserves praise for singling 
out ~he intimate connection between commercial freedom and 
the abolition of dread of war. -He would app~rently agree 
with the description of the word of Richard Cobden years ago 
aiming at ttRetrenchment, Free Trade and Peace tt • This is 
, not a worn-out shibboleth, 'but an aim and ap effort 'iqrthy 
of the best endeavors of the ablest statesmen today. • 
During this period there was little or 'no press coverag 
on Cordell Hull's activities regarding Latin America and the trad 
program. The trend seemed to be toward editorial comment, favor-
.,able and unfavorable. The New York Times especially followed the 
-----. ....... -
progress or rather lack of progress on the trade agreements pro-
gram. 
It ran an editorial on "Tariff Bargaining" again be-
rating the powers that were for their do-nothing attitude and tac 
tics because of the pressure of powerful lobbies who sought to 
keep tariffs protective in natureo Included in this editorial wa 
a discussion of whether business recovery was slow because of 
itrade restrictions or that business must reco~.'er, before trade re-, 
istrictions were to be lowered. "To suggest that lower tariffs } 
imust wait upon recovery of business certainly seems to be the verr.,' 
(r"averse of the theory that the way to revive business is to lo".\"er', 
I 
ltariffs. ,,22 
! 
I 
In February of 1935, there appeared a brief notice of 
~---------
21 Ibid. 
\ 
22 T' •• ~., January 29, 1935, pt. 1, 20:2. 
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signing of the ,trade pact with Brazil. The report was that 
Brazil hailed "with satisfaction and relief' ••• the news of the 
. 
conclusion of the American Brazil, trade treaty. n23 
The Chicag£ Dai!y Tribune also took note of the Brazil 
trade agreement. In a special article by Arthur Sears Henning, 
~'ttri ting from Washington, he contended that the Roosevelt tariff 
policy was being put to the test because Hull was "aggressively 
pushing negotiations of reciprocal foreign trade agreements and 
American manufacturers are protesting in increasing numbers a-
gainst the withdrawal of protection. n24 Henning added that the 
conclusion of the Brazilian pact had seemed "to reveal in bold rei 
lief the methods by which Mr. Hull aims to impel other nations to 
! ' 
remove barriers to foreign trade."25 Mr. Hull had refused to re-
veal nations on the so-called black list and, therefore, \~ould 
not benefit from the new pact. 
The ~ ~ _T_i_m~e~s defended the 'Brazilian pact as even 
26 the "most stalwart protectionist need not take alarm" at the 
Inew pact because the articles included are not ones in competitio 
f~~ri th our O\'ffi products. The editorial raised the point of the 
23 Ibid., February 4, 1935, pt. 1, 6:3. 
24 ChicagQ, Dai~ Trib~, February 5, 1935, pt. 1, 7:1., 
25 Ibid. 
26 N~ ~ Time,s, February 5, 1935, pt. 1, 1$:2. 
•• 
... 
most-favored-nation principle maintaining this principle cramped 
our opportunity for tariff bargaining. The ~ ~ Times said 
the treaty is extremely limited ~n range but hoped with Hull, ~ho 
, 
described the pact as "the fi~st break i~ the log-jam 6f inter-
national trade," that it will be the for<erunner of other pacts. 27 
The Chica~ Daill ~ also commented on the Brazilian 
pact bringing out the fact that in the days after vlorld Vlar I, 
markets were not a problem. It was easy to sell our products. 
But the depression days were hard on our producers and, therefore 
hard on all the people. Markets were sought "after in a most dili 
gent manner. The editorial said the r~cipocity route was the lOgJ 
icalone. The ~ felt that this pact was more significant than I 
'the Cuban pact because it did not involve political consideration I 
I 
and the products to be admitted did not seriously compete ,Yith ou 
,own products. The conclusion was noteworthy: ". 
'ian pact deserves the publicity it has received. 
• • the Brazil-
But the reci-
procity process is regrettably slow, and the middle west, ~nich 
Ihas a large stake in the revival of foreign trade, hopes it may b 
,\!accelerated. "28 
I There was some criticism of the Brazilian pact because 
L~ '~' the manganese ore included in the tariff concessions. Some I ~ 
l 
27 ~. \ :-
February 8, 1935, pt. 1, 18:2. 
I' I 
I 
! 
r 
l 
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a5 
critics objected to Hull's policy on account of these concessions 
Ito Brazil and particularly the one pertaining to t);).e ore'. The 
,New York Times wrote an editorial commend;ng 'Hull's reply to his I~ t:: They maintained reducing a tariff would bring about a tl 
I 
storm of protest from those manufacturers of the article and has-
tened to add: I 
It is, then, time for the officials responsible for the I 
tariff-reduction policy to stop talking generalities and to I 
point out as Secretary Hull has nOVi done, exactly how the 
specific duty on the specific article has been at the ex-
pense of all the rest of us as consumers, and by the retali-
ation it has caused. It is also a good time to point out 
ho'\"l those in the protected industry itself are taxed as con-
sumers for every other tariff, and even injured as producers 
by the general disorganization which an extravagantly high 
tariff policy brings.29 
The Louisville-Courier Journal commented on the recip-
·rocal trade policies of Cordell Hull as the most' logical step 
toward harmonious international relations.30 They agreed with 
Hull's thesis that the promotion of normal trade was the natural 
way in which to promote peace.3l 
The Chicago Daily Tribune was cited in the ~ ~ 
Times for its kind remarks about Mr. Hull's policies. According , 
to the editorial Mr. Hull was "one of the few men in Washington 
29 Ne~l Yo~ Times, February 12, 1935, pt. 1, 20:2. 
30 lhpll~i~_yJ;,11~-Qo;~e..£ Journ.91., cited in the Ne\1 York 
April -J, r:U~, pte 1, (5:6. - -
\ \ 
31 ~. f , 
j 
* ih+ 
• Iz ' , «' t ,.. , 'H 
$6 
whose activities are calculated to produce an economic recov-
ery. tt32 ,. 
I ' The Cleveland Plain Dealer said that Hull had ~rork~d 
consistently to overcome the harm done by the previous ad~inis-
, 
trations. The Reciprocal Trade Act made it possible to lay the 
foundation for increased trade with several smaller nations but 
the restrictions of the Smoot-Hawley policy hampered trade with 
the leading nations to which our exports were heaviest and from 
,which we must expect our heaviest imports. 33 
On the anniversary of the Reciprocal Tariff Act, 'the' 
I~ York Times editorial staff contended that the program was 
still in the experimental stage. They maintained the only treaty 
of consequence was th~ one ;concluded with Brazil but 'ihich had 
not been put into operation because of opposition in South Americ 
! 
and also because the Brazilian Congress had failed to approve the 
measure thus far. The Times maintained the failure was due to 
J 
the most-favored-nation principle and als,o to the "unyieldinG op-
position of most groups of American producers to any increase in 
imports."3£; Despite the efforts of Hull to sell the people the 
: :,.pril 
3 2 C~i cago Da:i.. 1 v Tribune, 
21, 1935:-pt. -4,-8:b~ - W' • -
\ 
! 
;1°35 
"-' , ! 
33 oC~eveland Pl~~B pealer, cited in Ibi1., April 2$, 
pt. h: 0: o. \ 
34 I"Jid. 
, . 
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idea that we must ,buy abroad if we hope to sell abroad, there was 
~this opposition on the part of the producers to r,educe tariff~ on 
'any item mentioned. As soon as the tariff on any product was spe 
" 
cifically mentioned as the one to be reduced there "IlaS a storm of 
protest and a wild scramble to lobby against such reduction. 
ISUCh opposition was partly responsible for the limited number of 
Itreaties which have been concluded; those vmich have been conclud 
ed had faced just such opposition. 
,For some time there seemed to be no interest in the 
trade program on the part of the press, as no articles, or edi-
torials appeared in the papers. The interest was resumed by the 
ipapers with the, opening of the 1936 Presidential campaign. Dur-
'ing this campaign the tariff program became a very vital issue. 
The Raleigh News and Observer reminded its subscribers 
- - .;;..,,;.;;,,;;;...;.;;;....;..;;.;.;;.. 
I I 
that the Republicans had proposed the Smoot-HarTley Tariff Act as I, 
a cure-all for the depression. As a remedy for'this unhappy fail 
~ 
ure Cordell Hull's reciprocal treaties came into being desp~te 
the rumblings of the protectionists. The ~ ~ Observe~ said: 
"Trade has been set free, men have been put back to work. A sub-I stantial beginning has been made in recoverin,O;: that international 
I trade 1tlhich was all but destroyed behind tariffs v;hich r;'.orc ef- I' 
',c, fecti vely strangled industry than protected it."3 5 
\ f 
cited in the Npw York 
, . 
. ' 
ee 
The Chicago Dailz Tribune slapped the administration 
tariff policies in an editorial, nTariff by Dictatbrsn•36 The 
occasion was a speech by Dr. Robert Lincoln O'Brien, a Republican 
o $ 
o from Massachusetts, who expressed approval of the reciprocaltrad 
,., 
treaties. He went so far as to say he was going to urge the Re-
publican convention to adopt a plank to perpetuate the new tariff 
making policies which Mr. O'Brien happened to discover "vastly 
preferable to the old log-r~lling method.,,37 The T!'ibun~ dis-
agreed with the findings of Mr. OtBrien.3$ It reminded him that 
the tariffs were not arrived at by impartial, expert study,rath-
er the very opposite is true. 
The fact is, of course, that they are made by politi-
cians in the executive branch of the government instead of 
politicians in the legislative branch. • •• P~. Roosevelt, 
like others ~dth dictatorial aspirations, has no use for 
scientific detachment. He wants what he wants and he means 
to have it. To him the great virtue of the reciprocal 
tarifCfJ arrangements is that he can mal-ce them. He can ac-
cept the recommendations of his experts if he wants to, but 
he is under no necessity in the matter. He c.::m use his con-
trol of tarifff]s to reward the faithful and punish his op-
ponents. If the tarif(fJ commission will not approve of his 
plan he may seek means of winning them over but if h~9fails 
he still can ignore the recommendation and go ahead.) 
36 
37 
38 
Chicago Dail~ Tribun~t April 
Ibid. 
20, 1936, pt. 1, 12:2.1, 
r·'Ir. 0 'Brien ',las the chairman of the Urli ted States 
Com:n~ S5].011. 
39 Qhi s.~s.?. 12D.:' 1y 'Iri l:mnc, April 20, 1936, bt'~ I, 12: 2. 
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The writer has found no evidence to support this thesis 
of the Chica,go Daily' Tribun~. Hull does not mention this dic-
tatorship on matters of tariff polici~s in~is Memoirs nor do any 
of the other wri ters which 1tlere consulted •. ·Since Hull does men-
tion other disagreements with Roosevelt's policies, and since the 
tariff situation was one of Hull t s chief interests", it seems logi 
cal that Hull would have mentioned such dictatorship had it ex-
isted. 
In the New York Times an article was found in which 
-----
Chester Davis, Agricultural Adjustment Administrator, said the 
farmers had benefited from the reciprocal trade program because 
the "income from agricultural exports to eight of the thirteen 
nations which we have such agreements increased 15 per cent over 
that of the corresponding period of la.st year, as against 5 per 
cent for nations not having agreements. n40 Since the farm group 
opposed the agreements, this statement is important as it was 
, 
uttered by the Agricultural Adjustment Administrator. 
The New York Times again defended Hull's treaties. 
-- -....-...... -----
IThis time they defended the treaties on the grounds that, despite 
Ithe cries that irr.ports were flooding the markets, the fact re-
! mains that fourteen treaties have no'tl been concluded yet, "our 
I 
\imports for the latest month reported are less than half those 
~ 
\ :' 
40 May 2?, 1936, pt. 2, 
, 
! 
\ , 
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for the comparable month of 1929, when the Republicans themselyes 
were in power. n4l At the same time our exports were increasing 
) 
which was exactly what Hull had hoped for in his plan. 
The Ciqcinnati. Eng,uir~ sa\-T in, Mr. Hull's defense of hi 
treaties the opening gun in the 1936 campaign as far as tariffs 
were concerned. The En~uirer felt that Hull had conducted his 
reciprocal trade program "not as a Democrat but as a public ser-
vant. There had been no hint of partisan bias or favoritism in 
making of these admirable treaties. ,,42 
I, The Chicago Daily Tribune was happy to print a report I by Arthur Evans on the attack upon Mr. Hull and,his trade treatie1 
by Congressman-Francis D. Culkin of New York. Culkin accused the I 
State Department by saying "they have placed the northern farmer 
on the 'good neighbor 'auction block t ."43 Culkin added to this 
that all the proceedings of the treaties were carried on with the 
greatest secrecy and maintained the "whole procedure was a clear 
violation of the principles of popular' government. n44 It was not · 
,difficult to understand why this article appeared while others of 
I \ , 
ipraise were left out of the pages of the Tribun~. 
I 
--------
I 
I ; August 
41 ~., July 20, 1936, pt. 1, 14:1. 
42 ~i.E?J;.6~ Enctuirer, cited in the ~ Yor~( Times, 
2, pt. t+, o •• 
43 Chicago Dail.l Tribune, October 8, 1936, ~t\. 1, 10:2 
44 Ibid. 
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During the 1936 campaign, Governor Alfred Landon as-
i 
sailed the trade program and in an Associated Press Dispatch Hull 
answered the criticisms made by Landon. Hull asserted there haa 
been a rise in exports since --the trade treaty program began and 
thereby justified his faith in the program. Hull was glad to 
quote: "From a level of slightly over $1,600,000,000 in 1932 and· 
1933 our exports rose to over $2,280,000,000 and continue this 
year on the upward trend. n45 
The Chicago ~ilX ~ denounced the Roosevelt adminis-
tration because the dollar had been devalued and, therefore, our 
dollar bought less than it did before. The conclusion was point-
i I 
10d: "Foreign trade is a swap. If we do not buy, we cannot sell. t 
No wonder our foreign trade under the New Deal, has reached a new 
lowl "46 
William L. Clayton, said to be the world's largest cot-
~ . iton merchant,in an expression to the ~hattanooga Times, said that 
(Secretary Hull "has patiently and unswervingly stuck to his prin-
ciples. A vote for President Roosevelt is a vote to keep Secre-
tary Hull in office, where his work, just beginning to bear fruit, 
1---I 45 9:.icC':.G2. Pc.ilZ~, October $, 1936, pt. 1, 9:4. 
I 46 ~. 
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may go forward with infinite benefit to the nation and to the 
world. ,,47 
Mr. Pfeiffer, the head. of Importers and Traders, defend 
ad Hull's policies on trade. "Pfeiffer said: 
The Roosevelt administration through the efforts of thal 
far-sighted statesman, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, has 
taken the lead in a determined attempt to prove that many 
supposedly necessary tr2de restrictions can be safely re-
duced, if not entirely eliminated, by carefully prepared and 
intelligent cooperation between nations, and thatnfew if' any, 
legitimate interests need suffer in the process. 4o 
The New York Times again came to the front ,dth an edi-
-----
torial agreeing completely with the stand of the Foreign Policy 
,Association ~mo maintained the gradual ~emoval of tariff barriers 
could not be resisted by those who objected to Government inter-
vention in business. The Foreign Policy Association described as 
inconsistent those critics of the administration who denounced 
,regimentation and at the same time denounced Hull's policies on 
trade. The Times approved this attitude of the Foreign Policy As 
sociation and concluded with: "The surest road to 'regimentation" 
is to propose a policy of extreme economic isolation. The best 
,antidote is the one urged by Mr. Hull: the development of foreig 
!markets to absorb the domestic surplus'es. ,,49 
I 
! 
I i"--------
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Harold Hinton50 in a special cable from Buenos Aires 
~said the Hull trade policies met obstacles since Ar~entinats for-
leign trade was greater than all of t~erest of ?outh America, not 
~ncluding Brazil. Argentina's'-example had great influence accord 
kng to Hinton and her slogan was "Buy from those who buy from uS."i 
raturallY such resistance to the Hull program was trying .men he 
iwas meeting resistance here at home at the same time and especial-
ly in the light of his efforts to secure the friendship of the I 
n , 
countries to the south. 
The year 1937 brought a problem to the front because 
the Trade Agreements Act was to expire in June. Hull was reluct-
ant to see his pet project thrown into the discard pile and so he 
promptly began to plan his fight for the survival of his beloved 
program for another three year period at least. He was well a-
I ware of the fact that the program had been one of the controver-
sial issues of the 1936 campaign and that the fight for extension 
would be an out and out struggle to save the program. He felt 
that the program was worthwhile and the records showed a marked 
increase in the trade of our country. Hull appeared before the 
,House Co~~ittee and prepared a statement for the Senate Finance 
,COT:...-r': ttee in 1::hich he defended the treaties and urged their ex-
I 
ltcnsion. 
I ' 
The opposition from the cattle, ~)'ool and copper states ! ! 
\ 
50 L~., December 20, 1936, pt. 4, 6:6. 
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exceedingly bitter. 51 The Con~ress10nal Record shows the bit-
struggle which took place during the hearings .·for there are 
countless pages of argument and d~bate on the matter. The exten-
sion was passed by a considerable majorityvfor another three year I 
eriod. 
In 1938 the trade program of Hull was .. adopted by the 
Americas at the Pan American Conference held in that year but JOhnl 
l'lhitaker, Chicagg, Dail;r ~ correspondent, warned that: "This 
Iforward step has the weakness, like everything else done at a con 
Jference of being a mere resolution of,words and paper but Hull 
~means to give it concrete reality by vigorous persecution of bi-
lateral trade treaties. n52 
Nothing of consequence appeared in the newspapers until 
late in 1939 and early 1940 when the battle began again for a re-
'ne;'la1 of the Trade Agreements Act for another three year period. 
The fight \'las a long and hard one and again the opposition came 
, 
'from the cattle, wool and copper interests. The matter was dis-
tcussed at great length in the House nnd the Senate. ~~ny of the 
editorials and opinions which ,d.ll be quoted appeared in tho Con-
(;rcssional Record e.s the ne'!:lspapers the writer was able 
\.-~
;did not feature any too much material as by this pc~~od 
I 
51 Hull, Mem9irs, I, 519. \ :-
52 9p~cn~2 ~~~~, December 16, 1939, pt. 1, 1:1. 
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more interesting struggle was being reported in the news because 
of the European situation. 
The Knickerbocke.£~; an independent Republican paper, 
said the American farmer and manufacturer cannot be displaced in 
the world market despite the cheap labor of some of our competi-
tors because we can deliver the goods needed in the world market. 
This newspaper reminded its subscribers that the trade across in-
:Iternational borders as well as the trade wi thin a country provide" 
more business, more wealth, more jobs and more prosperity.53 
The Reg! ster, independent paper of Des Iv10ine s, Iowa, 
Iwarned the farmer to look back into the early 1930 f s before de-
I 
'serting the trade agreement program. 54 The Regi,ster, independent 
Democratic paper of Mobile, said the nation must resist the oppo-
sition to the trade program because "the country's national wel-
'.Care m';.lct not be subjugated to selfish private interests. ,,55 
The Chicago Daill Times exhorted its readers to support 
, 
the trade program because it was very elementary economics--one 
i I 53 Knickerbocker News, Albany, N. Y., November 11, 
1.939, cited int'il3'-ConFfrmiona"'I Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 
.'-;:'o:('uary 19, 191y O, vor:-Uo·;-P'i. 1:r;-(}ashington, 1940, 1637. 
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must buy from foreign countries if we expected them to buy from 
. I 
us. The editorial berated the selfish interest~ of manufactuters 
and producers who were fighting the program, as well as the Sena-
, ". ' 
-- ',' , tors and Representatives who put the interests. of their constitu-
ents above the i·nterest of the nation. The editorial concluded: 
~ 
nSecretary Hull has patiently been obliterating the traces of the 
tariff mess of the 20's. For the first time the tariff problems 
are being handled honestly and scientifically. • • • It would be 
a political and economic crime to go back to the scandalous meth-
ods of Smoot-Hawley days.n56 
The C.incin.Y'/,ati !nguirer said the tr~de agreements have 
~ , had raults but they ha".,e been a big step forward fro!D. the log-
. . 
rolling tactics of former days. They represented na most import-
1 ant, contribution to world order. ,,57 
Hull made a speech before the American Farm Bureau Fed-
eration in which he maintained "prosp,erity can be achieved only 
in a world which is at peace. Hope of enduring peace among na-
In its usual hysterical fashion the Chico~o Herald 
. - .... 
, 57, .c!-.:!?:c.:i.pn~t1:. ,]!;E,qu:~E,c1:, November 29, 193 9~ c1 'ted in 
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IAmerican cited that part of the address and hurried to protest 
• 
"We will NOT regain American prosperity through any indirect and 
fatuous attempt to make all the REST of the world prosperou~ 
first. We can do it ONLY by thinking of M~RICA FIRST AND At-
'IWAys_n60 There were several other editorials and comments in the 
Chicao Herald American ~~itten in the same vein. They repre-1------ --_ .......... .--.;;.,;;;.;;;;;,.;;.;;;,;; 
sented such poor opinion and attitude that it seemed foolish to 
!h! Tim~ of Bayonne, New Jersey, maintained those who 
were endeavoring to destroy the trade program were the very ones 
~mo had guaranteed prosperity under the Smoot-Hawley program. 
!They b~cked up their contention by pointing out the 50 per cent 
I ' , 
,rise in our export trade of farm products' to trade-agreement counl 
i~ries \'lhile the farm exports to other countries \·:hich did not havl"" I ! ! I 59 !.ill. I 
60 !"bi,:+'_ \ I 
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trade agreements ~dth us declined slightly_ 
The ~ York Times said to abandon the trade agreement 
• policy woul.d be a blow at peace ?ond international cooperation" I 
.- .. but to renew the program would nreasse~t our faith that nations 
are not mere competitors in a ruthless struggle for markets, 'but 
, 62 
mutual customers dependent on each other •••• n 
The Oregon Journal, an independent Republican paper, 
suggested a worthwhile consideration to their readers. nFacts, 
not emotional prejudices, the whole rather than the partial effec 
of the Hull agreements should determine their fate_ n63 
Tim~ had a few comments to make on the situation of 
Hull's trade agreements. They mentioned the selfless devotion of 
.Hull to his program and his refusal to consider himself a candi-
(i~;.:.,.; .>;)J.' -:;"lO Fresidency. 64 ~ carefully ~:;: 
stacked up for Mr. Hull's program in a favorable manner despite 
the opposition's charges that farm imports had risen in the year 
, 
1937. [1935 a~d 1936 were the years of the drought and this ac-I counts for" the increase in farm imports ~ ~e article closed 
I . --61 !~ !t~~, Bayonne, New Jersey, December 5, 1939, 
i ci ~ed in the £Q£;J~!:.~:s..9J..on€J. Rcco~, 76th Cong., 3rd Sass., 194-0, I i1637• ' I 62 ll22 12r1 Ti~. December 19. 1939, pt. 1, 22:1. I 
( . 63 ~2:eEo~6{~q~~~~, January 8, 1940, cited in. the £2a- J 
i f!Z"css.:.on.?l i:~CC01~G, I (itl (;on:.:., 3rd Sass., 19:"0, 1639. .' 
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with this interesting observation: "But over the years Cordell 
Hull showed staying po .. "er, and gradually Franklin,·Roosevelt be-
came a Hull man, carrying out Hu+l doctrines whereas nowhere was 
Ithere any evidence that Mr. Hull was a New Dealer. n65 
. Newsweek wrote of the trade program in much the same 
manner as~. It, too mentioned the·fact that Hull had sacri-
ficed the possibility of being nominated to the office of Presi-
dent but preferred to stay with his trade program. It also cited 
figures and facts to back up the program. 66 
These editorials and comments give some idea of the I 
Ithoughts expressed by the press in the campaign for the renewal 
1
of the Trade Agreements Act. The Act was renewed for three years 
but only by a small margin of fi ve votes. 
from the news. The big news in all the papers was the progress 
of ~lorld War II, and once we had entered the conflict, the war 
In8ws was of major importance to the press. 
By January 1, 1943, twenty-five reciprocal trade agree-
ments had been negotiated, sixteen of those were with those of 
said: I, 
; co'.mtri e s j 
I Bailey in cowcenting on the Trade Agreements I ! '--------
65 ~., 17. 
66 
i"1 91,0 1.+' -1 S .. ~ _.. h._, __ 
I 
"Troubled Tennessean", ~e\t~'::ec~, XV, January 22, 
r,_~_ .. ~. _____________________________ -.! 
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It ••• it is difficult to determine the economic consequences of 
ithe program but it has unquestionably done much 'to improve int,er- '" 
8 f . 
~ational good will, especially w.ith the Latin American coun-
tries. "67 ,--
. '. 
Bemis said the Hull program on trade 'became known as thei 
· ew Reciprocity and also the cornerstone of American foreign POli-1 
y when the United States became a full belligerent in vlorld viar 
· I. 68 
Sumner Welles, in his latest book, Seven Decisions ~ 
(Shaped History, said Y'Jr. Hull failed to realize that even his rr~de agreements could not turn the tide against the dictators an' 
~r~ng peace to the world. Welles presented this thesis on the 
atter: "But no matter how beneficial a liberal economic regime 
ight have been in more normal times, after 1936 no economic reme 
dy could have dissipated the military threats that confronted all 
the democracies. n69 
It is difficult to evaluate the Trade Agreements Act be 
cause of the abnormality of the times during World \'lar II and in 
,the period of unrest which followed in the world after the war an' 
• 
I .•• ",~ c\.. pClr""~sts ~ ........ __ .. 1. 'C t.:,)_ 
, 
, 
i lvaluation, ';;he 
I~-
~: 
even today. Regardless of tho i~poGs~~~lity of e- \ 
Trade Agreements Act ~1as extended for another threE'j 
\ 
\, 
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year period in 1945. Needless to say the action greatly pleased 
~tr. Hull w.~o had resigned from the Cabinet. Even. though no longe~ 
active in the work of the gover~ment, he continued to write and 
watch his pet dream continue-tn its work of fostering economic 
good will. 70 
70 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1721. 
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CHAPTER IV 
" 
ARGENTINA 
9, 
Argentina has presented a difficult' prOblem 
to secure hemisphere solidarity. This problem arose 
in attem;t; I 
from several 
factors which need to be taken into consideration in discussing 
that country. 
Argentina is a country more like the United States than 
any of the other Latin American countries. Its climate is simi-
lar to our own; its products are similar to ours. Because of a 
favorable climate she, like the United States, has developed to a 
marked degree in comparison ~dth her sister republics. Argentina 
, 
1 cov.ntr'j~ • ".' .... !"\ ~ ~ -.!! ,..>~, J ~,. ~,. -, ' , ""... ~ 
ileader of South America. She is jealous of any help . . ,! \Hll. C.l l. S gl. V ' 
en to Brazil. ,Argentina's populationi s mostly of European ori-
, ? 
gin and she still looks to Spain and Europe culturally,N and her 
economie life is tied in very closely with that of Great Britain 
! 1 Carlton Beals, "Argentina vs United States, ",Cu;:~ 
19~!~~Z' L July, 1939, 28. See ~lso Clarence H. Haring, £?~ 
I~erica baok~ ~ ~)!.-~. Y.D:l.t~~ ,States, Ne\·[ York, 1929, 194-195. 
I 
I , 
,. 
2 ~':hi te, Arp;entina, 62. 
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and Europe.) This economic relationship with Great Britain and 
Europe is due to the similarity of products of the United States 
and Argentina. It is due, too, to our past. tariff~ pplici.es ,'tlhich 
. . . 
. . 
have kept Argentine products "'out of the United "Stqtes in the name 
of protection, protection of American products. 
There has been a feeling of dislike and distrust to\>lard 
·the United States on the part of Argentina. This feeling dates 
back to the year 1824 when Argentina was the first South American 
country to recognize the MOnroe Doctrine; she sought to base her 
foreign policy on collaboration with the United States and the 
Monroe principles.4 Since the United States did not encourage 
this move on Argentina 1 s part, ill-feeling was created. Along 
with this fact was th~ 'Falkland Islands situation. The United 
; States fC'.:tlr:-d to uphold Argentina 1 5 claim to the Falkland Isl<?nds 
,-
when they were occupied by Great Britain and agai~ ill-feeling 
was created by our failure to recognize her claims during the cerl 
tury of dispute with the British. 
And there was beefl Under an act of 1$90 the United 
States Government had full authority to prevent the importation 
of infected cattle and sheep into the United States and in 1903 
the authority was extended to include meats, hides and other ani- , 
3 Ib:.(~. \ 
257. 
! ________________________________ -J. 
1'1 
, 
r;~r-! -'" -----
! 
I 
! 
I 
lcal products. Tne reason for these restrictions was that hoof 
!:nouth disease was prevalant in many countries and .. especially 'in 
Argentina. 
Argentina has always held this restriction on meat and 
meat products against us~ She has felt that the hoof and mouth 
disease was used as an excuse to keep her meat out of the United 
States when the truth of the matter has been, in her eyes at 
least, that we just did not want her meat and meat products in 
competition with our own. There is some justification for this 
• 
,contention since there are parts of Argentina where hoof and mout~ 
disease is unknown and since the canned meats were also refused 
admittance to the United States it does appear to be hard to 
plain the situation. 
ex-
Sumner ~'Jelles claims our record in this re-=::ard 5.~ not a[:' 
I 
'black as it is painted, yet he says t'le cannot justify our att;i~:ld€:.\ 
on canned meats because our tariffs were uniformly high; nor can 
tariffs on agricultur~lproducts bejustified.5 lour attitude on John Vfuite, the leading authority on Argentina feels 
Imeat is the crux of tho situation as far as the United States and 
~-~~~+4n~ 40 conce·~npd 6 He ~~.V~ thp U~it"_d St~.tcs has u[:ed the t: 4 '8" , . ..;."'." .... ..,..- a ..A.V ..... ..". ... -- J- -- - -- -
ihoof and mouth discasn as "merely a subtcrfu!;e to keep hi~h-cualiJ, 
, c ~ i 
5 
6 
\'lo11e5, Ti~ .£ot: D0Cis:i.o:q,' 23$ ... I 
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ty but low-priced-Argentine meat out of the ,American market, wher 
the American product could not compete" ~th it.'"!. This fact ~s 
apparent to Argentina. On the 9ther hand \\Thi te pointed out that 
since Britain put a quota on"'ineat imports, there was no reason 
why Argentina should expect us to buy the surplus. However, 1~it 
thought for reasons of international policy we should admit small 
8 quantities of Argentine beef. He maintained this would not up-
set our meat prices yet would greatly increase Argentinafs annual 
,income and promote a more amicable feeling between the two coun-
tries. 
During the Conference at Montevideo Hull was able to 
win Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas to a certain degree as has been cen 
tioned in Chapter II. Upon his arrival at Buenos Aires in De-
cember 1933, Hull tried to secure the friendship of A!"rentina~ 
pointing out that Argentina had worked "shoulder to shoulde~, parJ 
o ticularly in promoting peace and a system of economic order./ He 
hoped that Argentina would try to learn more about us and through 
friendship and friendly intercourse the two countries would be-
come a "powerful force for good in the, world. "10 \'7~rtenbaker 
7 Ibid. 
-
g !.?~£., 197. 
9 lh:.ll, A4§r:23.0...e1? e.~ gate~~!-s, 53. \. 
10 Ibid. 
~.-""'.-
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credited Hull with a profound influence in Argentine attitude 
\i 
lowing the r·lontevideo Conference. He felt that Hull' s ~cooper-
ation with Saavedra Lamas was an important factor in bettering 
th t t · 11 e wo coun rJ.es. .. -
In February 1936, Sumner Welles addressed the Bar As-
sociation of Baltimore on the Trade Agreements Program. In this 
speech he mentioned the ill-feeling which had existed between Ar-
gentina and the United States noting this fact: 
The Argentine press and economic publications were 
filled with denouncements of the commercial policy pursued 
by this Government and ~dth pleas to the Argentine people 
that they buy from tho se ,mo bought from them, and that pur~ 
chases from the United States be restricted if not elimin-
ated. • •• Today, not withstanding the practical diffi-
culties ~lhich "tle both recognize, both Governments are co-
operating in the closest manner to improve the flow of 
co~~erce between them, to remove such barriers to trade as 
can be removed without injury to the interests of either 
one, and the two Governments have further cooperated in a 
most cordial and effective manner for some time past in 12 
the great peace work undertaken by the Chaco Conference. 
An attempt was made to ratify the Sanitary Convention 
, 
of 1935 between the United States and Argentina which would have· 
alleviated the bitter feelings of Argentina over the beef ques-
Ition. Failure of the Senate to ratify the Convention lessened 
I--
I 11 Wertenbaker, A New Doctrine for the Americas, 'I ,104-10 5. - - ._- . - - .. I 
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Hull t s prestige an'd opened an old wound in the Argentine. 13 The 
. 
ratification of the Convention was'preve~ted by the Senators ofi 
the Farm Bloc who were "protecti·ng" the interests' of the western 
cattlemen. 14 , , 
Very little notice was given in the newspapers to 
through the State Department. The meeting place suggested was 
Buenos Aires in the hope of securing ~rgentine cooperation. The 
agenda was prepared by our State Department and emphasized the 
need of consultation in case of the threat of war. 15 Argentina 
shO'l1ed i·;illingness to cooperate provided the meeting place ,,;ould 
I,; be in Buenos Aires as had been suggested. Plans, therefore, i-;ent I 
,I i ! ahead for the Conference. f 
I 6---------------! 
\ 
I 
I , 
I 
! 
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~;fuite, L~{!!}!}::..'f}E~, 258. \ :-
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In a special cable to the New ~ Time,§., John ~1. 'White 
writing from Buenos Aires, said: "The South American nations 
" 
have never awaited any other int~rnational conferencJ with so 
much hope and enthusiastic optimism as ther display in awaiting 
President Roosevelt's Pan-lunerican peace conference at Buenos 
Aires. n16 He also said that they are planning to bring to the 
Conference projects and proposals which will solve virtually all 
the problems of the Americas. Not only that, he felt that the 
Latin Americans were confident of the success of the Conference. 
I 
Mr. White contended that this attitude grew out of the 
success of the Montevideo Conference where Cordell Hull put forth 
every effort to insure just such an attitude. vfuite wrote: 
It is only fair to say that their present enthusiastic 
attitude toward the forthcoming conference is a compliment 
to S7cretary?f State. Cordell Hull, to \1homSou~h Ame~~cans 
""~"~mO"lslv ~~~e credJ.t for the succe~s ~+ ~~o ~~-~"'~r-~ '"-·.<J, ... (" ...... t" __ .... L~~ \, .". b.J.. V 0 C~ ... , ,,_'AO.~ .. ~.-' .:.' ........ " :. ',' .' .. ~_, '.-' ,"'" 
Conference, and it is significant that the enthusi2.GL'l for 
the forthcoming Buenos Aires conference dates from the an-
nouncement that Mr. Hull would head the United States dele-
gation. 
Upon their unprecedented experiences at Montevideo the 
South Americans base their present confidence that the forth 
coming conference ,'lill accomplish results in the \"ray of sOlVl 
ing inter-American problems. This very attitude is the most 
~romising featur.e of the preparation for the Buenos Aires i 
conference, because it is promising of a successful outcome. I 
?1,,:) South A."'!lericans ar.e going to Buenos Aires confic.ent of I 
cuccess and prepared t~o cooperate for the com~l1on \';elfa:~e.17 I I i,--I 16 N21! .Yo~k !!.~, April 19, 1936, pt. 4, 6,:3,. 
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In August of 1936 an editorial appeared in the ~ ~ 
Times entitled "The President on Peace" in which ;t told of Pres-
ident Roosevelt's reference tp our cordial relations and concili-
ations with South America brought about by his administration. 
The editorial said: "Mr. Roosevelt is strongly of the opinion 
that the forthcoming Pan-American Congress in December at Buenos 
Aires will round out and solidify this work of friendship, so as 
to make it certain that war shall be banished from this entire 
hemisphere. nlB The editorial also commented on the praise which 
~~. Roosevelt gave to Hull for his part in breaking down the 
"senseless barriers to international trade.,,19 
Again in September the New lork Times contained an ar-
ticle written by Bertram D. Hulen in which the accomplishments 
,of the administration's Latin American policy were reviewed, not-
(; 
so that none of our armed forces remained on foreign soil in the 
'ttlestern Hemi sphere; the abrogation of the Platt Amendment and the 
renunciation of our right to military intervention in Panama; thel, 
18 Ib~., August 15, 1936, pt. 1, 14:1. 
19 lli.£!. \ 
\ 
.1 
l 
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success of our delegation at the Montevideo Conference. 20 l.u-. 
Hulen looked forward to the Conference with hope and optimism be-
cause of the increased good will.which had been created by the 
• 
policies of Cordell Hull. . --
In November the Chicago Daily Tribune had an editorial 
on "New Friends for the :r..lonroe Doctrine" based on a dispatch from 
Norman Ingrey, Tribune correspondent. Mr. Ingrey reported a 
change of attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine had begun to appear 
in South America. The editorial quoted 1e. Naci6n which said: 
I"South America has now only the ~~nroe Doctrine to fall back up-
on. "21 Ingrey said Musso1ini was the reason for this change r;~ ) 
attitude because of his imperialistic tendencies in Ethiopia. j 
The Tribune concluded its discussion of this change of feeling to 
. ~':~~l -:-.~:,o 1',",):r:'.!'r:'9 Doctrine by pOinting to the core: ......... ~'.'E'nQs Aires· I 
Conference. " ••• perhaps we shall find its atmosphere Dore 
friendly than hitherto.,,22 
Roosevelt traveled to Buenos Aires to open the Confer-
ence. According to the Ne'lfl York Times Roosevelt was ' .... elcomed ns 
.....-- ------ -
\ 
I 
i ~ 5, 1936, 
• ~ 
L.4: 1f) 
~ 
20 Ibid., September ~O, pt. 4, 7:4. 
21 La Naci6'n, cited in Chicago Daili-" Tribune, 
pt. l~ll;:i~ ~ ---~-
22 ,.,. D . 1 m' b liT b 5 19'")6 1 ~ ~.::~'1:2. 2.1. Y l.rl. una, A~ovem er , -" pt. , 
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no one else ~ad been welcomed. 23 Roosevelt declared that non-
American states who sought to commit acts of aggre,~sion would '. 
; ,; 
find the Western Hemisphere "prepared to consult together for our 
mutual safety and our mutual @Ood. H24 
Cordell Hull sought to win the Argentine delegationand~ 
in a sense did secure some cooperation from Saavedra lr~s but 
the former cool, distant feeling was apparent once more. Hull 
was deeply grieved at this coolness and a new Argentine bloc. 25 
Saavedra Lamas, Hull felt, had been unduly impressed \'rl.::.~.3 
League and was bound to oppose anything which was opposed to the 
League. 
Sumner Welles maintained it was at this Conference in 
Buenos Aires that Hull developed such an antipathy to Argen-
tina.26 Welles said that at the Conference he was forced to act 
as interpreter for Hull and Saavedra LarJ.:'.S and. :~(; :l~-:_:'·:· 
Hull's remarks because he feared an 'open brawl. He attributed 
Hull's ill-feeling to Lamas's opposition to the leadership of the 
I United States, and his failure to see Hull off at the end of the 
'- Hull, 
i 
~ 
i ~ 606. 
~ 
r 
! 
I 
23 ~ York T5.mes" December 1, 1936, pt. 1, 1: 8; also 
~Gmoirs, I, 497e I 
. ,
2l~ Rosenman, f£~ Papet~ 2£ Eoosevel.!, Vol. 5 ~ 193$" 
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Conference, despite the fact that Hull had unofficially suggested 
~. 27 Saavedra Lamas receive the Nobel Peace Prize. . ,. 
The Conference was presented with Hull t s program to: , 
coordinate the five existing peace'treatiesinto one common a-
greement; to secure a definite agreement to cO'nsult together in 
case of a threat from without or of trouble from within; to set 
up a common neutrality policy in the event of war or other form 
of conflict between the American republics. As usual Argentina 
blocked the attempts of Hull, remembering her old grievances or 
corn, wheat and beef and remembering, too, the failure of the 
United States Senate to ratify the Sanitary Convention of 1935. 
Hull was disappointed in the outcome of the Buenos 
Aires Conference because of the obstructionist attitude of Ar-
. ":A"i't.5 ....... ,., 28 Ht:"\','re"~r so!"!e good was a.ccom~li. ~hed and Hull outlines 
these three main points agreed upon by a':l ; .c.:;.~l" "" ~ 
The first ''las that the American hemisphere has a dis-
tinct and peculiar contribution to make because no nation 
in it is driven by any compulsion or professes any right to 
threaten the peace of its neighbors. The second was that 
the only safety for all nations is loyal acceptance of a 
rule of law under which the integrity of every country, 
large or small, will be assured. The third was that re-
nunciation of war and other similar declarations must be 
implemented by a method of action \';hich CQ~ set into op-
eration almost inztantaneously the cooperative effort of I 1-------- ,I i 27 ~., 105. 
I 28 Hull, l,J.cmoi.:r:~, I, 501; ,also Welles, Jilt£:-;t:O":r: l 
ID';d.sion,206-207. I' f ---.-.-.~.--L-_____ .______________________________ ~ _________________ ~ 
I I 
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the hemisphere in the direction of pacific settlements. 29 
The Conference at Buenos Aires, said Welles, was "in-
trinsically the most important i~ter-American gathering that has 
ever taken place. "30 'V'elles'maintained there "'lere two issues at 
Buenos Aires: 
The first was whether the American republics would a-
gree to create some workable machinery to operate promptly 
whenever intercontinental disputes threatened a breach of 
the peace or whenever the security of the hemisphere was 
menaced from abroad. The second "'las whether they "lOuld jointly recognize that a threat to the safety of anyone of 
them involved the security of the remaindero Unless these 
two principles could be established, no regional system 
could be developed, and no hemispheric unity could be a-
chieved ,:Jhich could be depended upon as a protection in 
time of i~~inent danger.31 
While Roosevelt was in Buenos Aires, he learned that 
much of the antipathy of Argentina fqr the United States was due 
~to the beef question. Before he left Argentina, he promised to 
bring hi s influence to bear upon the Senate in ol'd,cr to 'I.'~:i ':'.::d 
get the Sanitary Convention of 1935' ratified. This promise en-
couraged the people of Argentina, but they were to be disappoint-
ed as Roosevelt was unable to override the powerful cattle bloc 
29 Hull, Memoir s, I, 503. 
I .30 \Velles, ~ !~ .f.2!: Deci..§..io"a, 206; also Sev~q i ~sJsions, 104. 
I 31 Welles, ~ ~ for Decision, 206. 
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of the Western states.)2 
~ on January 4, 1937, printed a quot.~ .from Leland 
Stowe, who cabled his paper the Republican New York Hera~q ~-
. 
~ from Buenos Aires: "It i-S agreed that the prestige of the 
United States has never been so high among its twenty sister Am-
erican republics as at present, and the good will dividends of 
the President's Good Neighbor policy should be'a great asset in 
the next few years, especially if Europe goes to the brink of 
war. n33 
At Buenos Aires the republics agreed to consult with 
each other in case of a threat to peace within the Western Hem-
isphere, but the idea of a permanent Inter-American Consultative 
Committee was dropped. A common neutrality policy was kept as a 
''''''':'r''t:'::''.'11 ob5~cti ve but e~.ch count.ry "r~.s free t·r,. :~.ct. in accordance 
with its treaty obligations.J4 
Another convention adopted ~s more ~mportant than the 
one above because it dealt with action in case' of a threat to 
peace from the outside. Under this convention they agreed to 
. consult and collaborate in the event of a menac~ to their peace 
~ :/-------I 32 \\fhi tney H. Shepardson, The United States in World I Aff"irs, 1937, Me., York, 1938, 145-140. - .. - I 
' JJ NeVi York ~ts~£ !riQ..une, cited in !h~\2.~ XXIX, Jart- . 
j l.,:[!.ry 4, 1937, 13. I I 34 Hull, !:!c!!l~ir~, I, 499. \, I 
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from any source. 
Thus, for the first time, the American ,.Republics sought 
to lay the groundwork for meeting the threat to their peace 
which might come at any time as war clouds lowered o~er Eur-
ope. The :Monroe Doctrine protected them from dangers over-' 
seas, but that doctrine"had come to assume in the minds" of 
many of their leaders a connotation of domination of the 
"[estern Hemisphere by the United' States. Under the new con-
vention the American Republics took on~ step in the direc-
tion of a hemispheric 1~nroe Doctrine. J5 
On April 15, 1937, the ~ ~ Times contained an edi-
torial on "Pan American Day" in which was discussed the Latin Am 
erican relations. The President had given an address on Pan Am-
~ erican Day in which he told his listeners of the notable improve-
Iment in inter-American relations since 1933. The editorial said: 
••• until recently Pan-America was little more than a . I. 
phrase expressing lofty aspirations, has within the last 
four years been given substantial content by President 
Roosevelt's good neighbor policy. Secretary Hull, by in-
spiring confidence in the United States among Latl.n rLrneric 
.',~l"··:""·-·: :",0' nnd b·· hi S ""'eroistent ad .. rocac'" of f ..... ·',·,.,.'r· 7." ,.~,,~ re-
..- ~.; • .; .... - "0' ~ _ .. ~_. "'-' <:.. 'J - 1:-''' '-..1 J V .. ' • ". ' " .,.,. 
1a"J.·ons 'nas o~~e'!ldi· 1y a r1 'f"ranc O d +··1.0 Frr., ~ "'1,~~~1,... i'-·,1-~4'p.·>·':; ":'"(~ .., ., .... \" '-' ... ".... yo .• ", v' ... " 'I •• --... ,-,_,,,,, v ~. Iv '.'.- • -'-
But the progress ~ms in turn facilitated by Assistant Sec-
retary Sumner '\fJelles and his c'olleagues in the Latin Am-
erican Division of the State Department, who labored so in-
telligently to prepare the necessary technical projects and 
to cl·ear a'ttlay the accumulated encumbrances of years. Uith-
out this preparatory \'lOrk the Buenos Aires Conference and 
its large promise for the future might indeed have been im-
possib1e.3o 
The eight agreements reached at Buenos Aires w'ere sub-
mitted to the President who in turn submitted them to the Senate I 
I 35 ~., 55. \ :-36 ~~ ~ ~~~s, April 15, 1937, pt. 1, 22:3. ; ~ 
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tor ratification. In commenting on this tact Harold Hinton wrote 
from Washington: "The submission to the Senate this \-Teek ot the 
most important of the agreements reached at Buenos Aires ••• 
marks another step in the development of the 'good neighbor' 
policy which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have been pa-
• 
tiently evolving for four years.,,3? 
Hinton was careful to point out the opposition of Ar-
gentina to the neutrality legislation proposed, attributing it to 
the obligations of Argentina to the League of Nations and her 
commercial relations with Europe.38 Hinton felt that the Buenos 
Aires Conference showed a remarkable advance in the name of peace 
because none of the countries showed any inclination to break the 
peace. 
Another valuable step was achieved, according to Hinton~ 
1 
37 ~., May 30, 1937, pt. 4, 7:6. 
38 Ibid. 
- \ 
39 Ibid. 
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The i~terest in the Buenos Aires Conference was not so 
widespread as it had been in the Conference held··at Montevideo. 
The New ~ Times was one paper which did follow the Conference. 
I>lost of the papers did report-the warm reception given' to Roose-
velt but they did not follow the Conference as had been done pre-
viously. After the Conference interest died dO\1n in the events 
which concerned Hull and his Latin American policies. Little or 
noth!ng appeared in the press because there was little which was 
startling or new to be presented to the people •. However, there 
was one short article on Hull's defense of the Sanitary Conven-
tion. 
As has been pointed out, Roosevelt realized that the 
ratification of the Sanitary Convention would go a long way to-
,.~.,ard implementing the good neighbor policy in Argentina, as the 
failure to remove the prohibitions on beef had long been an open 
sore to the Argentines. He, therefore, tried to exert his in-
, 
, 
fluence to have it ratified. Hull tried to secure its ratifica-
tion in order to encourage further better relations with Argen~~ 
tina. 
The New York Times carried the article in which Hull __ ....... 0;;;.;;.;;. 
~ iappealed for the ratification of the Sanitary Convention and at- I' 
jtempted to assuage Argentina's sensitivity over beef. The Con- I 
,vcntion provided for sanitary embargoes on a regional\ basi z ::-s- j I . 4 
! ther than a national basis. This would allo\'! beef from Patagonia I I ; 
, 
--.----
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to be admitted since this area showed no evidences of hoof and 
, outh disease. To Hull this was a fairer way to treat the situ-
He asserted the pending treaty would contribute to "a 
ealthy expansion of our mark~ts tor our farm products through 
aiding the recovery of our foreign trade.~4l 
Thus beef continued to be the sore spot between the U-
nited States and Argentina because the failure to ratify the Sani 
tary Convention showed the hopelessness of the situation despite 
ullts efforts at neighborliness and good will. It was more im-
portant to protect the men of the cattle industry, not trom the 
hoof and mouth disease which did not exist in Patagonia, but from 
the importation of beef by the United States which would have 
strengthened the ties and induced Argentina to buy from us be-
cause we bought from them, thereby increasing the flow of trade 
etween the two countries. 
In defense of our position, White pointed out that in 
1937, we bought 102,000,000 pesos of linseed from Argentina and 
Great Britain bought 180,000,000 pesos of chilled beef but that 
no mention was made by Argentina of this purchase on our part. 
tJther countries restricted or prohibited the importation of meat 
from Argentina without the action ever being made a political 
,iszue, as was the case in our action. 42 
~ 1----
~ 41 ~.t ~~y 7, 1937, pt. 1, 11:1. 
\ 
, 42 White, A.:t::.f.::.~~:t:1~::, 218. 
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Another"offense on our, part which.irritated Argentina 
was the refusal to allow Argentina to serve her o.wn meat at her 
pavilion at the New Yo"rk and San Francisco Fairs. 43 Yet these ., 
Fairs were supposed to increase neighborliness in the world% 
President Ortiz was elected to the presidency in 1937 
and the ~ !2!! ~imes expected him to continue the policy of 
friendly cooperation with the "United States.44 After the elec-
tion the Ortiz government announced a step which was hailed by 
our press. There was to be an end to the secrecy and censorship 
which had existed in Argentina for some time. The ~ ~ Times 
commented: "This is a complete reversal of the retiring govern-
ment's policy of handling the news."45 
The infiltration of Axis agents into Latin America 
seemed to go unnoticed by our press. Our diplomatic representa-
ti ves, however, continued to report case after case of ~,;azi penc- j 
tration "and the buildup of propaganda against the United States. 
We were accused of intervention, monopoly of trade, and favorit-
ism. " , 
Prior to the opening of the Lima Conference in 1938, 
43 Weil, Argentine Riddle, 14-15; also Beals, "Argen-
tina vs United States", Curre'ntITis-tory, L, July 1939, 28. 
44 ~ Yor~ Jimes, September 12, 1937, pt. 4, 4:1. 
45 ~., February 23, 1938, pt. 1, 16: 2. \ :-
l 
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the New York Times featured an article by Harold Hinton under the 
- -
ti tle "Hull Again Takes Up the Pan American Torch:~. I-ir. Hinton 
reminded us that the Secretary of State was the one who has real-
. 
1y given meaning to Pan Americanism. He said: " ••• much of, 
the impetus that he has given to closer inter-American relations 
has been tbe result of his o~~ reasoning; he has not coasted with 
events, letting them shape his course for him."46 Hinton reiter-
ated some of Hull's accomplishments and his very human approach 
to the problems of the Americas, where, he realized, "problems 
may differ, but men remain men. n47 According to Hinton, this 
accounts for Mr. Hull's popularity in Latin America and for the 
ngood press" he received in Latin America. 4$ 
As Hull left for Lima where the Eighth Pan American 
,Conference was to b~ held, he questioned whether the rest of the 
~republics would realize the serious threat Y"h::'c~: ",:.- .. ~, ..... , .. :" 
New world. 49 He wondered about Argentine cooperation; Saavedra 
Lamas was no longer Foreign Minister; he had been replaced by 
Jos& Maria Cantilo. Cantilo had urged the postponement of the 
1 Lima Conference informing our representative in Buenos Aires that 
i 
I 
~ 
i 
I 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Ibic!. , 
Ibid. 
....... 
Ibtd. 
-
Hull, 
November 20, 1938, pt. 7, 6:1. 
\ 
l'1emoir~, I, 602. 
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Argentina believed in a policy ot continental solidarity and col-
laboration but could not be expected to turn her 5ack on Europe! 
On December 5, 193$, just a few days before the opening 
of the Conference, John Whi te'-sent a specia'l 6 able to the ~ 
• York Times from Lima, Peru. According to him the Latin American 
-
countries were: 
preparing to push hard at the forthcoming Pan American Con-
ference to torce the United States to put the Good Neighbor 
policy into a concrete form that will insure its continuance 
after the termination of President Roosevelt's administra-
tion. 
At present the Good Neighbor policy is merely a declar-
ation of policy contained in President Roosevelt's inaugu-
ral address. The Latin Americans have come to Lima deter-
mined to implement that declaration by means of interna-5l tional agreements that would have the force of treaties. 
White added that the good neighbor policy will continue to work 
one way trom nnorth to south at the expense of American inves-
tors. n52 He granted relations bet\"leen the United Stat.es ~~nd t:_:.' 
Americas to be friendlier than at any other time, but, he con-
tinued nthe United States has lost much prestige throughout Lat-
in America as a result of its failure to take a stronger stand 
on the confiscation of American oil fields by Bolivia and Mex-
I 
50 Ibid.; also Edward Tomlinson, nMeaning of Lima", 
Current History, XXXIX, February 1939, 37. 
51 Ne~ ~ Times, December 5, 193$, pt. 1, 1:$. 
52 Ibi,d. \ 
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On December 6, 1938, a United Press di~patch from Lima, 
. i 
Peru warned that na group of South Ameripan nations led by Ar-
gentina laid the groundwork·-today for a dip10matic ba~tle at. the 
Eighth Pan American Conference against President Rooseveltts pro-
gram for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. n54 The dispatch 
went on to stress the importance of the Conference because of the 
developments in Europe and the Far East and also because of 
Roosevelt's declaration that preparation must be made for the de-
fense of the Americas. 
The ~ .I2r.! .;;,Ti;;o· m~e_s was doubtful of the outcome of the 
Conference. This paper wondered about Argentina and her usual 
opposition to proposals of cooperation and help~55 Would Argen-
tina oppose the delegations at Lima as was her usual manner? 
iii 
The United Press di spatch from Lima on December 7, 1'1 
1938, said Roosevelt was winning the, Latin American states to the li!11 
solidari ty plan as approval seemed certain. 56 Despite this op_· II!II' 
timistic report, the United States was reluctant to seek written ,1/ 
accords because of Argentine opposition to any proposals from thel 1.:1 
53 Ibid. 
-
54 Chicago Dai1~~, December 6, 1938, pt. 1, 5:5. 
55 New York Times, December' 8, 1938, pt. ,I, 1: 2. 
-- \~ 
Iii 
I: 
I, 
56 Chicago ~y- News, December 7, 1938, pt. 1, 1:3. 
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United States. ~ Jose Maria Cantilo, the Argentine Foreign Minis-
.. 
ter, declared formal pacts to be unnecessary~ecause it was under 
stood the Americas would stand ~ogether in the event of inva-
sion. 57 The dispatch from the United Pres's pointed dut that th~ 
issues were vast. "They may mean success or failure for men and 
nations far removed from the Western World.,,58 
The United Press dispatch of the next day said the dele 
gates had begun to fall in line with a,program calling for con-
tinental solidarity against foreign aggression. 59 No mention was 
made of Argentine opposition in this release. 
John Whitaker, writing from Lima for the Chicago Daily 
News made several interesting observations from there. He told 
how "whispering in the, ears of representatives of the other twen-
ty American republics whom he buttonholed in smoke-filled hotel 
rooms, Secretary of State Cordell Hull has envisaged this hemis-
pherets defenses as military and political as well as econom-
) 
ic.,,60 To Whitaker, Hull had triumphed over Cantilo's propaganda 
against Yankee imperialism and dollar diplomacy and had won pres-
tige and honor in the eyes of the Latin Americans because of the 
57 
5a 
59 
60 
New ~ Times, December a, 
Chicago paily News, December 
!Ei£. , December 8, 1938, pt. 
Ibid. , December 9, 1938, pt. 
1938, pt. 1, 16:2. 
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manner in which Hull handled the Mexican relations over the sei--
zure of oil fields and properties. This handling, of the !v1exican 
si tuation, according to the cab~e, "ha~ brought good will in t; 
South America, even if it has-scandaliz~d somJ'North America~O v 4 
61 ~ · ? business interests." , <f 
Hull was anxious to get a resolution adopted which was 
strong yet acceptable to the delegates. His proposal bound 
the republics to resist any threat, either direct or in-
direct, to their peace, safety, or territorial integrity on 
the part of any non-American country. In case the peace of 
anyone of them were disturbed by direct or indirect inter-
ference on the part of one or more non-American governments 
in a matter pertaining to national sovereignty, the Repub-
lics proclaimed their common concern and their purpose to 
make their solidarity effective.to resist such threats. The 
Republics agreed to hold meetings of their Foreign ~linis­
ters every two years, and a special consultation of these 
~nisters could be called by any American Government if .the 
occasion for it arose. 62 
This proposal was strong, but Hull felt that thes{!' ~t:,~re 
'1'1 I, 
I:! 
extremely serious times and, therefore, needed an extremely III 
strong resolution which would insure the safety and cooperation 
of all the Latin American republics. He felt this was not the 
time for half-measures; the republics must be united, firm, and 
strong. 
An interesting editorial appeared in the Chica~ Daily 
Tribune which poked fun at the idea of trying to unite the repub-
61 Ibi~. \ 
62 Hull, !;.1emoirs, I, 603 •. _ l ______________________________________________________________ __ 
.,.-...--,.---
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lics against the -dictators, since most or the Latin American 
countries are dictatorships themselves and have been for years. 
The Tribune mentioned the little democracy which existed in Cen-
. 
tral and South American countries; Europe was in the same posi-
tion with few exceptions and these exceptions were weak from a 
military point of v1ew.63 The conclusion drawn by the paper was: 
A realistic foreign policy would recognize these facts 
as facts, there are no allies upon whom we can count. ~le 
cannot rescue Europe from itself, but if we are wise and 
maintain our army and navy in a reasonable state of prepa-
ration we can -prevent Europe from imposing its barb6r ism upon us and our neighbors. The rest is applesauce. 4 
On the eve of the Conference, in Time's viewpoint, 
Hull and his Chief's good neighbor policy had notably softened 
Latin American distrust of the United States, but by no means re 
moved it entirely.65 
Hull and Cantilo addressed the opening session of the ~ 
Conference and there was a similarity between the speeches which 
seemed to indicate a unanimity of ideas.66 Hull made his point 
clear: He was condemning outworn philosophies that "for centu-
ries held men in bodily slavery and spiritual degradution tt and 
16:2. 
63 p.hicag£ Dai1t Tri.bune, December 9, 1938, pt. '1, 
64 Ibid. 
65 "Hull , 193$," Time, XXXII, December 12\ 1:-938, 12. 
66 Ibid. 
-
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he hoped for the adherence of nall other. nations or groups within II 
nations wh!ch, at times against great odds, and i~ the face of 
heartbreaking difficulties, are working for a better world. n67 
According to Hinton who cabled tnis article, Hull's speech was a 
personal victory. His speech was greeted with roaring applause 
throughout and after its conclusion. At the ending of the speech 
Cantilo rushed forward to greet Secretary Hull and escorted him 
to his place.68 , 
Hull considered the next ten days the most difficult of 
his career.69 The apparent warm friendly attitude of Cantilo and 
his cohorts had vanished into thin air. Cantilo left his dele-
gation and disappeared into the Chilean lakes area after the 
opening session. This showed how lightly he had taken the situ-
i 
ation and how much cooperation could be expected for the rest of 
the sessions since he instructed the Argentine delegates to do 
little or nothing without first consulting with him. These in-
structions brought about delay and ill-feeling. Hull felt that 
Cantilo had run out on the Conference in order to kill it.70 
An article appeared in the ~ ~ Times discussing 
67 ~. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Hull, Memoirs, I, 605. 
70 :ll1i. 
, 
127 
Argentine opposition. The writer said: 
The Argentine republic has 20ng been a hotbed of hos- -
ti1ity to us. Suspicion of our motives has never died here. 
\\'hen the delegates left here for the Conferenc'e, emph,asis. 
was carefully laid on the fact that it would stick close to 
the traditional Argentin-e- policy--a prominent ingredient of 
Which7 is opposition to anything even remotely North Ameri-can. 1 
The press in Berlin had comments to make on Hull's 
speech in Lima. They dubbed the speech as "Dollar Imperia+ism". 
This dispatc~ copywrited by the ~ ~ Times was sent from Ber-
lin. It read: 
The German press commenting on Secretary of State Cor-
dell Hull's speech in Lima Peru, emphasizes "dollar imperi-
alism ff , of which the United States is accused here in its 
relations with Latin American countries. The press ridi-
cu17d as72laughable" the possibility of a "threatened in-vasJ.on". 
Tne Berliner Lokalanzieger said: 
Hull brought forward everything with which to atte~~t 
to excuse Washington's hegemonic wishes before the South' 
Americans. The latter will, on their part, supposedly be 
thankful for this, for they have experienced the fac-t that 
his majesty, the dollar, iS7Qrie 0'£ the most inhuman dictator ships in all world history. j 
The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung called the speech "pro-
fessional" and said it was to be expected in view of the recent 
statements of President Roosevelt and his government, "wi thou.t 
110: 6• 
!1 
71 N~w'~ Times, December 12, 1939, pt. 1, 12:2. 
72 Chica~q p~ill Tribune, December 11, 193~,~pt. 1, 
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leaving much impression behind". The same paper also commented 
that the Latin American countries wer"e none too eager "to sail 
in North American waterways without a rudder."74 
In a scathing editor1al the Chicago Daily Tribune ac-
cused President Roosevelt and Hull of warmongering in South A-
merica at the Lima meeting for reasons purely Political.75 The 
Tribune saw no evidences that the dictators Hitler and l~ssolini 
were about to invade the Americas but it does see a serious dan-
ger of Latin America meddling in the affairs of Europe because of 
a resolution being prepared by Argentina and Mexico regarding me-
diation in the Spanish war. 76 However, the Tribune admitted sooe 
basis for fear of a commercial aggression. The editorial con-
cluded with this statement: WIf the dictators of Europe are 
seeking to monopolize Latin-American trade we may have to take 
some steps to counteract their tactics. Promoting a war scare 
will not help us think about the commercial problem more clear-
ly.,,77 
Argentine opposition continued and there was some feel-
ing against Hull according to John Whitaker. Whitaker maintained 
74 llii. 
75 ~., December 14, pt. 1, 16:2. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
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that some of the delegates Hare fed up with SecretarY Hull's in-
sistence there must be no quarrels in public and that conference 
. 7$ 
measures must be brought forward only upon unanimous consent. " 
vlhitaker said that Hull took .. a; middle of the road course but he 
felt confident "the conference will end with a unanimous chorus 
singing a tune pitched just about where Marse Cordell likes it.n7~ 
Alfred Landon was one of the delegates to Lima who 
spoke at the Conference. This pleased the Chicag~ Daily News. 
This paper wished the delegates at the Conference would speak out 
as·Landon had. They accused the State Department of going "to 
almost any lengths to spare the supposedly hypersensitive feel-
ings of our Spanish-American neighbors. "80 The News said: 
-
the one-way traffic in our so-called good neighbor policy_ 
We want to be good neighbors, certainly but we would like to 
see a little more reciprocity than we are finding right now 
at our southwestern frontier, or, for thqt matter, among 
some of the neighbors assembled at Lima. 51 
The Conference went on and after much debate and per-
sonal effort on Hull's part the Argentine Foreign ~linister sent 
a draft of a new declaration which seemed acceptable and in acco~ 
with the draft that Hull had prepared. However, it did not pro-
7$ Chicago Dail! News, December 20, 1938, pt. 1, 1:4. 
79 Ibid. 
-
80 Ib~., December 21, 1938, pt. 1, 16:1. \ \ 
81 Ibid. 
-
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vide for regular meetings of Foreign l~nisters but such meetings 
. g2' 
were to be held whenever any republie.took the i~tiative. On 
Christmas Eve tpe declaration was unanimously adopted. Persist-
. ~" , , 
ent effort on Hull's part had,- brought fo~th. Ii document whi em wa~, 
acceptable to everyone thereby assuring' the world of the unity 
of the American Republics. 
For Hull the steps taken at Lima were a great advance 
over what had been accomplished at other conferences. It was an 
agreement which affirmed that the American Republics would help 
.one another in case of foreign attack. It provided for joint ac 
tion against military action and also against infiltration meth-
ods. Accordingly the responsibility to defend the hemisphere 
was not the job of the United States alone but of all the Repub-
lics of the hemisphere. B; 
The reason Hull strove so hard for solidarity was that 
he did not want the outside world to have an opportunity to say 
we were divided in matters of Latin American policy. In giving 
the closing address at the Conference, Hull said: "And so in 
this Declaration of Lima lies the future of the solidarity of th 
American Republics. H84 
82 Hull, Memoirs, I, 607. 
83 Ibid., 608. 
g4 !E.i£., 611. 
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. Hull maintained the Declaration of Lima ~as ~ot a vic-
tory for anyone country but for the New World. .. I,t l.s drafted I ~ 
by Dr. Cantilo but followed cl~sely Hull's original draft. Ac-
cording to the~ York Time~ it went much farther than ~&enti~a 
had intended. f!5 t • 
Whitaker wrote from Lima and said the Conference ended 
on a note of confidence in the United States due to the "kin~li­
ness, patience and sincerity of Hull •. Should it become necessary 
to negotiate for naval or air bases the necessary good will will 
f!6 have been achieved." 
The Chicago Daily News ended its comments on Lima in 
an editorial which complimented our delegation on its tact and 
accomplishments at the Conference in face of the real truth that 
these Republics are really not homogeneous but are separate en-
tities, each with its own balance of power, nationalis~, econo~ic' 
problems, jealousies, quarrels and, "yet out of this came a unan-
imous declaration which if loyally carried out, should take care 
f!7 pretty well of the propaganda danger." 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, in closing its discussion on 
Lima, objected. We have not been as victorious as we should have 
f!5 ~ ~ Times, December 26, 193f!, pt. 1, 22:2. 
86 Chicago Daily News, December 27, 1938,\P~. 1, 1:9-
87 ~., January 4, 1939, pt. 1, 18:1. 
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.; 
been; Peru was not the perfect host; we must keep a smiling front 
among ~ ~ neighbors because of -the possibil;ty that some 
Latin American dictator might make an alliance with some Fasc~st 
88 
state. Nothing complimentary was said of the Conference by the 
o 
Tribune. From its viewpoint we had "been taken". 
Sumner Welles said the Lima Conference accomplished 
little beyond "implementing the basic principles adopted at 
Buenos Aires. n89 
Stuart said the Declaration of Lima was vitally impor-
tant because it promised to defend contihental solidarity against 
foreign intervention and provided the machinery to make it effec-
tive. 90 
Accox-ding to Tomlinson, Hull was called the "Father of 
American Solidarityn. His success in uniting the Republics was 
01 
credited by every delegate or the Conference.; 
The next step Which drew the attention of the press to 
Latin American affairs was Roosevelt's approval of an order to 
buy 48,000 pounds of corned beef from Argentina for the use of 
14: 2. 
88 Chicag~ Dailx Tribune, January 12, 1939, pt. 1, 
89 Welles, Time for Decision, 208. 
90 Stuart, ;eR~rtm~~~ of State, 33e. I 
~1 ___________ 9_1 ___ T_om __ lk_.n __ so_n __ ,_T_tM_e_a_n_i_n_g __ o_f __ L_i_m_a_n_, __ 3_9_. _____ \__________ ~1 
I 
.~ 
\ 
... 
133 
the Navy. Roosevelt based his approval on three conditions: it 
was cheaper than any ~f the bids submitted by packers of the U-
ni ted States; it was the best corned beef available; i t wa~ gooA., 
. hb 1· 92 ne1g or 1ness. --
Naturally this order aroused a storm of protest in the 
Senate as once again the cattle interests were being ~put upon". 
The Chicago Daily Tribune was calm in its editorial. The editor-
ial mentioned the reasons which Roosevelt had given in appro\~ng 
the purchase and the protests of the Senators representing the 
cattle interests. 93 Later another editorial in the Tribune said 
that Roosevelt was attempting to reduce the American farmers to 
peasants because of the support given to the Argentine people by 
buying their product. 94 No one denied the report that Argentine 
95 
corned beef was superior to the American product. 
The St. Louis ~ Dispatch reviewed the corned beef 
situation in an editorial, brought on no doubt by the fact that 
Congress had passed legislation which would forbid the buying of 
corned beef from Argentina. The editorial, "The Corned-Beef Fi-
192-193. 
92 Rosenman, Public Papers 2! Roosevelt, VIII, 1939, 
93 Chica~ Dail~ Tribune, May 13, 1939, pt. 1, 1:1. 
94 ~~, May 19, 1939, pt. 1, 6:1. 
95 NevI York Times, May 16, 1939, pt. 1, 1~5~ 
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asco", asked just what were the facts in the case and promptly an 
, I 
swered by saying the beef was superior'~o our o~ product; the 
oney paid to Argentina would find its way back'here in the form 
of purchases of American goods: 96 The action showed, said the 
editorial, that 
sectional interests triumphed over the interests of the Na-
tion as a whole in question of foreign trade. • •• The in-
cident throws dramatic lights on Secretary Hull's reciprocal 
trade policy by which, against tremendous obstacles, the 
Secretary is trying to introduce against common sense and 
sound business principles into our trade relations with the 
world. 97 
Shortly after the "beef fiasco" the war in Europe began 
Naturally the press concentrated on the latest war news and com-
ments on Hull's Latin American policies faded into nothing. \'lar 
news was of first importance. 
Immediately after the Qutbreak of war the Latin Ameri-
can countries felt the need for a consultat:lon and p,l.::ll'~G ~,·':::·C 
laid for the meeting in Panama. The result of this meeting in 
September, 1939, was the Declaration of Panama which proclaimed, 
neutrality and a zone around the Americas south of Canada in 
which belligerents were to refrain from naval action in this are-
a. This declaration secured without too much opposition showed 
96 St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 2, 1939} cited in 
Congressional Record, 76tnlrrong., 1st Sess., Append~x, 2365. 
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the value of the ,previous conferences at which the groundwork ha 
been laid for such cooperative action .. 
Bailey said that the Declaration of Panama is of im-
.. 
portance nas a spectacular e~ample of collective Pan-Am4ri~an'ac 
tion, as a step in the further 'multilateralization' of the lw1on-
roe Doctrine, and as an attempt to restrict belligerent action 0 
the high seas in the interests of regi~nal security.n98 The 
failure of the declaration to function was laid to the fact that 
the American Republics were unwilling to use force to enforce it 
provisions. 99 
Up to this point Hull had shown the world that the Re-
publics could be united and pursue a course or action which was 
of vital concern not only to our hemisphere but as it developed 
to the concern or the whole wor1d.100 
98 Bailey, Diplomatic Hlstory, 762. 
99 Ibid. 
-
100 For a further consideration of the Argentine ques-
tion and the attitude of the press refer to O'Malley, IvIary, 
The Attitude of the United States Press Toward Ar~ntina from 
1']J0-19/+ 7. ~iiPu'5lTshed 1VTaster' s Thesis, Loyolaum. versi"'tY;--
cEicago, "Illl.nois, 1950. 
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CHAPTER- V 
CONCLUSION 
-
In the closing chapter of his Memoirs, Cordell Hull 
In the past, until 1934, perhaps our most flagrant vio-
lation of our duty to the world was economic isolationism. 
Ages of civilization have taught us that international com-
merce promotes material welfare, peace, and advancement. 
Intellectual and social progress in the Ancient World, the 
Middle Ages, and the Modern Era was the result in large part 
of the reciprocal influence of nations on one another. But 
we Americans have not fully learned this lesson. ~'le sho\"{ed 
the world a true example of the right way from 1934 until 
the end of the war by embracing a policy of liberal com-
merce, tariff reduction, and nondiscrimination, but since 
the end of the war there has been evidence of tendencies to 
return the United States to the disastrous course of the 
twenties and early thirties. High tariffs do not bring us 
prosperity. They do bring us unsalable surpluseslat home 
and the resentment of other nations abroad. • • • 
Thus Hull again states his philosophy on trade. He be-
lieved firmly and sincerely in this--that the security of the na-
tion was based on trade and nonintervention and noninterference 
in the affairs of our neighbors, whether they be to the south of ' 
our United States or in the Eastern Hemisphere. His whole pro-
gram was based on an intelligent trade program. These policies 
I , 1 Hull, Mernoir~, II, 1735. 
136 
\ , 
I 
> "m YfW 
... 
I 
137 
of good will, trade, nonintervention and noninterference were a 
return to the earliest principles of our foreign policy. Our 
policies, if carried out by all, seriously and earnestly, would 
make each nation a Good Ne~ghbor. 
Hull warns us, not only of the need for freer trade but 
also that we must 
practice moderation in our expressions of· opinion concerning 
other nations. As a people we are too prone to condemn oth-
er nations and rulers, to apply. epithets, to caricature, to 
ridicule. We forget that our sharp words are not buried in 
newspaper columns or lost on the rostrum or radio. They 
come to the knowledge of the governments and peoples they 
anathematize; they are reproduced and commented upon by the 
press and radio of those countries, which may not understand 
our freedom of criticism~ and they hamper the conduct of our 
foreign relations. • • • 
This paragraph seems of paramount importance to the writer. The 
research for this thesis has shown without a doubt the need for 
an intelligent and unbiased press at all costs. 
damage has been done and ill-will created by the failure of some 
members of the press, at times, to consider the good of the whole 
rather than the good of the few; the good of the nation rather 
than the selfish interests of one section our own country. It is 
hard for those beyond our boundaries to evaluate and understand 
correctly our freedom of expression; a freedom which must be 
safeguarded at all costs but it must be remembered by our press 
\ 
2 !£i£., 1737-1738. 
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that there is an attendant responsibility for every freedom which 
we enjoy. Our press, then, has a responsibility to safeguard the 
good will of our neighbors just as Cordell Hull was willing to 
do. 
---
Sumner Welles' description of Hull seems to sum up com-
pletely the man who has had such a profound influence on world 
policy as Secretary of State for twelve years and who deserves to 
rank as a foremost proponent of the ~tin American policy of the 
United States. Welles said: 
viii. 
He is a persuader rather than a leader. He relies on 
the ultimate triumph of reason to solve all human problems. 
He could not, if he would, coerce anyone into an intellectu-
ally repugnant course. His life, public and private, has 
exemplified that kind of democracy, governmental, intel-
lectual, and spiritual, in Which lies the future hope of the 
human race.) 
3 Welles, in the forward to Hinton, Cprdel~ ligll, 
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